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Summary 
 
Stock markets in emerging economies are often viewed as a source of financial 
development and ultimately economic growth. Well-operating or efficient stock 
markets may contribute to the development of a country’s financial sector through 
increase in savings, efficient allocation of capital to the most profitable investments 
and improved use of the existing resources. Efficiency of stock markets is especially 
important for countries with developing economies as these countries aim to catch 
up with global economic growth. For countries with emerging economies to benefit 
from equity financing, it is important that their stock exchanges at least pass the 
lowest level of market efficiency, that is, weak-form efficiency. This implies that 
existing stock prices reflect all information about historical prices and trading 
volumes. 
Emerging economies share common features in particular with respect to 
their financial sector where the banking system dominates in raising finance, while 
stock markets are relatively less important (indirect versus direct finance). However, 
by providing alternative means of financing investment, stock markets may curtail 
the effects of bank dominance. In Suriname the banking system has traditionally also 
been the major player in the financial sector. With this the stock exchange in 
Suriname can be seen as an alternative financial source. 
Given the role that the stock exchange in Suriname can perform, this thesis 
investigates the Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE) as part of Suriname’s financial 
market. We study the empirical properties including weak-form efficiency of the 
stock returns of ten companies listed at the SSE. We also considered stock price 
performance of these companies and the link between that performance and 
fundamentals. We managed to collect unique data through various possibilities of 
data collection. 
An interesting facet of economic growth is that much of it occurs through 
the growth in the size of a country’s existing companies. This increases an interest to 
understand more about the top executives of the companies listed at the SSE. They 
are responsible for the financial and strategic decisions and if we want to 
comprehend why companies perform the way they do, we must reflect on the 
  
characteristics of their most influential actors. Their risk attitude is considered to be 
important in the value creation for shareholders and future investors.  
Most if not all current research focuses on the risk attitudes of top executives in 
westernized companies. We investigate the risk attitudes of leading executives in an 
emerging economy and we relate their risk attitudes with company performance. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 General motivation 
 
Stock markets in emerging economies are often viewed as a source of financial 
development and eventually a source of economic growth (Billmeier and Massa, 
2009; Yartey, 2008). According to Yartey (2008), the market capitalization of 
emerging stock markets has doubled, increasing from USD 2 trillion in 1995 to 
about USD 5 trillion in 2005. For example at the end of 2005, China, with the largest 
economy among other emerging economies, has a stock market capitalization of 
USD 780 billion (Asia), Chile with USD 136 billion (South America) and Jamaica 
with USD 13 billion (Caribbean) (World Bank, 2015). For the sake of comparison, 
the United States as a mature economy has a total stock market capitalization of 
around USD 16 trillion (World Bank, 2015). 
Well-operating stock markets may contribute to the development of a 
country’s financial sector through increase in savings, efficient allocation of capital 
to the most profitable investments and improved use of the existing resources, and 
thus leading to economic growth (Caporale et al. 2004, Singh 1991). Therefore, 
Fama (1970, p. 383) stated: 
 
“The ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for resource 
allocation: that is, a market in which companies can make investment decisions, and 
investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of companies’ 
activities under the assumption that security prices at any time “fully reflect” all 
available information. A market in which prices “fully reflect” available information 
is called efficient.” 
 
Hence, companies seeking to raise capital at lower cost can benefit from stock 
markets where it is essential that stock markets receive reliable information from 
8 
 
companies. The efficiency of stock markets is especially important for countries with 
developing economies as these countries aim to catch up with global economic 
growth. In addition, stock markets in these countries can offer means to attract 
foreign capital to finance investment and growth (Buckberg, 1995). However, for 
countries with emerging economies to benefit from equity financing, it is important 
that their stock exchanges pass at least the lowest level of efficiency, that is, weak-
form efficiency (Magnuson and Widdick, 2002). This implies that existing stock 
prices reflect all information about historical prices and trading volumes. 
 
The essays in this dissertation focus on Suriname, a country in South 
America with an emerging economy. The World Bank classifies Suriname as an 
upper middle income country which are countries with GNI per capita between USD 
4,126 to USD 12,735. According to definitions on emerging markets presented by 
authors such as Hoskisson et al. (2000) and Meyer (2004), Suriname can be 
recognized as an emerging economy or emerging market. 
Emerging markets share common features in particular with respect to their 
financial sector where the banking system dominates in raising finance, while stock 
markets are relatively less important (indirect versus direct finance). The financial 
sector of Suriname comprises of the Central Bank of Suriname, commercial banks, 
the National Development Bank, investment and finance companies, insurance 
companies, pension funds, savings and credit unions, foreign exchange bureaus 
(cambios), money transfer houses and a stock exchange (Ramsaran, 2012). 
According to the Central Bank of Suriname, the banking sector holds about 77 
percent of financial sector assets. Furthermore, financial intermediation, calculated 
as private sector credit as a percentage of GDP, increased from 15.5% in 1996 to 
26.8% in 2008 (Ramsaran, 2012). This is still lower than the region. It can be 
concluded that financial resources are highly concentrated in the banking sector. 
However, by providing alternative means of financing investment, stock markets 
may curtail the effects of bank dominance (De la Torre and Schmukler, 2007). Thus, 
the stock exchange in Suriname as part of Suriname’s financial market can be seen 
as an alternative financial source. 
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The Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE) was established in 1994. Very little is 
known about the actual behavior and performance of the SSE. This can be explained 
by the limited availability of information which is often the case for developing 
economies. Up till now the SSE has not been fully considered as a means to generate 
financial development and economic growth. It is of interest to know whether the 
SSE functions efficiently. Therefore, investigating Suriname’s stock exchange is 
intriguing as we provide the first ever quantitative analysis of the stock returns of 
companies listed at the SSE.  
The listed companies on the SSE may contribute in the process of economic 
development of Suriname. According to Rehman et al. (2014), an interesting facet of 
economic growth is that much of it occurs through the growth in the size of a 
country’s existing companies. Therefore, we need to consider companies’ top 
executives who are responsible for the financial and strategic decisions. Hambrick 
(2007) indicates that if we want to comprehend why companies perform the way 
they do, we must reflect on the characteristics of their most influential actors, and 
these are their top executives. Their risk taking tendency is considered to be 
important in the value creation for shareholders and future investors.  
Most if not all current research focuses on the risk attitudes of top executives in 
westernized companies. In this dissertation the focus will be on the risk attitudes of 
leading executives in an emerging economy and we relate their risk attitudes with 
company performance. 
 
1.2 Outline of this dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of four empirical studies on aspects of an emerging 
financial market. In Chapter 2 we introduce the stock exchange of Suriname. The 
empirical properties of stock returns are studied for ten companies listed at the SSE, 
which is a young and growing stock market. Individual stock returns are found to be 
predictable from their own past to some extent, but the equal-weighted index returns 
are not. Dynamic correlations with large Latin American stock markets appear to be 
zero. It is concluded that there is much more efficiency to be gained for the 
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Suriname Stock Exchange. A concise version of this chapter has been published in 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade (2015).  
Chapter 3 is based on the size and value effects in Suriname where we 
study the link between stock returns and size and book-to-market equity (value) 
effects for ten companies listed on the Suriname Stock Exchange. We use the 
approach of Fama and French (1992) and examine the relation between stock returns 
and size (ME), book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME), and earnings-to-price ratio 
(E/P). We find that there is apparently no size effect, but there is a value effect. This 
chapter has been published in Applied Financial Economics (2014).  
In Chapter 4 we examine the risk attitudes in company board rooms of 
companies listed on the Suriname Stock Exchange. The members of the board of the 
company like the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO), and also members of supervisory boards have an impact on the total 
performance of a company. Therefore, we study the influence of various 
characteristics of these members on their risk attitude in the decision making 
process. With a personalized survey as proposed by De Groot et al. (2012), we 
collect data for thirteen members in the board room. This is a small sample size as 
the population is also small. Nonetheless, we are able to test various hypotheses that 
are put forward in the literature. 
In Chapter 5, we extend our study by analyzing the relation between the 
risk attitudes in the board room and company performance of the ten companies 
listed on the Suriname Stock Exchange. Interesting for our study is that recent 
literature on risk attitudes focuses usually on western industrialized countries. The 
literature which mostly draws on western economies, guides our formulation of the 
hypotheses. We will consider risk attitudes for board members in a country with an 
emerging economy. We personally interviewed thirteen board members and we use 
various characteristics as proxies for their risk attitudes.  
In chapter 6, this dissertation is concluded with the main findings, the 
limitations of this study and various policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
The Stock Exchange of Suriname: Returns, Volatility, 
Correlations 
and Weak-form Efficiency 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The empirical properties of stock returns are studied for ten companies listed at the 
Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE), which is a young and growing stock market. 
Individual stock returns are found to be predictable from their own past to some 
extent, but the equal-weighted index returns are not. Dynamic correlations with large 
Latin American stock markets appear to be zero. It is concluded that there is much 
more efficiency to be gained for the SSE. 
 
 
A first version of this chapter appeared as Bodeutsch, D., & Franses Ph.H.B.F. (2014), The Stock 
Exchange of Suriname: Returns, Volatility, Correlations and Weak-form efficiency (No. EI 2014-02). 
Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus School of Economics. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Stock markets can signal economic growth, and for many industrialized countries 
stock market returns provide some predictability for future economic performance; 
see Barro (1990), Fama (1981), and Fisher and Merton (1984), amongst others. It is 
important that stock markets operate efficiently as efficiency is essential for proper 
wealth distribution and asset allocation to the most productive investments. In 
assessing stock market efficiency, three levels of informational efficiency are 
recognized and for this study we will focus on weak-form efficiency (which is the 
lowest level of efficiency). Weak-form market efficiency is conventionally defined 
as that future stock returns are not predictable from their own past (see Malkiel 
2001, Samuels, et al. 1981, and Robinson 2005 for similar approaches). Market 
participants cannot thus be granted the opportunity of earning excessive returns on a 
consistent basis by analyzing past prices. 
For developing countries the positive impact of proper stock markets can be 
viewed as being even more important as such countries seek to catch up with 
worldwide economic growth. When their stock markets would be weak-form 
efficient, it would attract (foreign) investors which may boost economic prosperity. 
Stock prices would reasonably provide an indication for the optimal allocation of 
resources. Hence, for emerging economies it is even more relevant to have a weak-
form efficient stock market. Seddighi and Naian (2004) and Magnusson and Wydick 
(2002) provide a recent empirical overview of the efficiency of China’s and Africa’s 
stock markets, while Watson (2009) analyzes the efficiency of stock markets in the 
CARICOM sub-region. Other exemplary studies which focus on the efficiency of 
stock markets in emerging economies are Butler and Malaikah (1992), Claessens, et 
al. (1995), and Urrutia (1995). 
In this paper we address the weak-form efficiency of the stock market of 
Suriname, an emerging market, which has never been analyzed as such. A main 
reason for this omission might be that the returns data have to be manually collected 
and coded, a task that took us a few weeks. In evaluating weak-form efficiency, 
researchers have concentrated on statistical tests for predictable patterns in stock 
returns.  
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The Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE) has a few peculiar properties, and we 
discuss these in this paper. The SSE was established in 1994 and from that year 
onwards ten Surinamese companies began the trading of their shares. At the end of 
2012, the shares of eleven companies are traded with the larger part belonging to the 
manufacturing sector, of which ten ever since 2003 for which we can obtain 
consecutive time series data. 
We examine the empirical properties of these ten listed stocks on the 
Suriname Stock Exchange and we also produce what tentatively can be called a 
stock market index, which is simply the equally weighted sum of the ten individual 
returns. We use equal weights instead of market values-based weights as it turns out 
that not all annual reports of these companies for these years are available. We 
discuss the properties of the returns, of the volatility and we also consider potential 
correlations between the individual stock returns. Next, we test for weak-form 
efficiency and we correlate the SSE index with various other Latin-American stock 
markets. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief 
description of the Suriname Stock Exchange. In Section 3 we examine the properties 
of the returns data, and we also test for weak-form efficiency. In Section 4 we 
conclude with a discussion. 
 
2.2 The Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE) 
 
Suriname is a country in South America, with French Guyana and Guyana as 
neighboring countries to the west and east, and in the south it borders Brazil. The 
country is sized 163.000 square kilometers, which is about one-third of Spain. In 
contrast, Suriname has only about 500.000 inhabitants, which is about one-
hundredth of Spain. Until 1975 Suriname used to be a colony of the Netherlands. In 
recent years, Suriname has benefited from high commodity prices. This is stimulated 
by strong activity in the oil, bauxite and gold sectors, as well as in public investment. 
GDP per capita has grown from US$ 2,610 in 2003 to US$ 8,864 in 2012. However, 
up till now the SSE has not been fully considered as an option to propel economic 
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growth. In Figure 2.1 we present the GDP per capita for Suriname for the period 
2003-2012. Figure 2.2 presents the course of the exchange rates for Suriname with 
regard to the US dollar and the Euro for the period 2003-2012 and Figure 2.3 
provides the import and export figures of Suriname. 
 
The Stock Exchange 
The Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE) is located in Paramaribo, the capital of 
Suriname. It was established in January 1994 and it started out as an initiative from a 
group of private sector companies. At present, the SSE still has no legal basis and it 
is self-regulating. A shortcoming is the absence of a Securities Exchange Act. In 
practice, primarily company shares are traded on the SSE. The exchange is open for 
trading two times per month on Thursday using a manual trading system. The 
outcome of a trading session is presented in an exchange report (bulletin). There is 
no central clearing and settlement system. The criteria for admission which are 
determined by the Board of SSE are stated in the Exchange regulations (SSE 2007d). 
These are the size of the securities packages which are available for free trade should 
be revealed, the disclosure of audited financial statements and the financial position 
of the issuer.  
 From 2003 to 2011, there is no considerable change in the number of 
companies listed on the SSE and low volumes of shares are traded. Nonetheless, the 
total market capitalization has grown from approximately 145 million SRD at the 
end of 2003 to 1.29 billion SRD by 2011. In Appendix A we provide information 
about the SSE listed companies. In Appendix B we provide information of the 
development of the SSE based on the indicators size and liquidity as reported by 
Craigwell and Alleyne (2004) as well as turnover (total shares traded) per company 
over the years 2011 and 2012. Supply and demand information of the ten stocks is 
not available so it is difficult to report in detail how liquidity of the ten stocks 
evolves over time. 
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Comparison of SSE with Caribbean stock exchanges 
The three major stock exchanges in the Caribbean region are the Jamaica Stock 
Exchange (JSE), Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange (TTSE) and the Barbados 
Stock Exchange (BSE). According to Arjoon and Greenidge (2007) and Watson 
(2008), these exchanges have all been characterized as inefficient, underdeveloped 
and illiquid with only a few listed companies. The SSE has a number of 
characteristics which are rather similar to these stock exchanges.  
 First of all, and not unexpectedly, the SSE is rather small which can be 
derived from the relatively limited trading activity and from the small number of 
listed companies. Details are presented at 
http://www.surinamestockexchange.com/nl. A second feature of the SSE is that it is 
privately owned and is managed by a Board mainly consisting of corporate players 
of listed companies. Third, the availability of information of the SSE is good, in the 
sense that information on past prices is available starting from 2003. That is, the 
half-monthly reports are partially available through the website. However, for the 
proper functioning of the SSE, more reliable and easily accessible (financial) 
information should be provided. Furthermore, only a few brokers are active on the 
market, that is, only brokers who are admitted by the Board are allowed to 
participate on the exchange on behalf of their clients.  
In sum, the way the prices are set suggests that there is some level of 
illiquidity in the market, and that there are no designated market traders. Further, 
trades occur only twice a month and there are low volumes of such trades. Therefore, 
it seems that the SSE is operationally inefficient. The consequences of the 
inefficiency for the empirical data are studied below.  
 
2.3 Data 
 
The data used to examine the weak-form efficiency of the SSE comprises of the 
closing stock prices of ten companies listed on the SSE for which consecutive time 
series data is obtained over the period January 2003 to December 2011. We 
manually collected the data for the stock returns from the half-monthly reports which 
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to a large extent were obtained from the exchange afterwards. In Appendix C we 
present an excerpt of the raw data that is available to us, where it is also visible that 
it can happen that prices move from, for example, 1.07 to 10.70 (more on this 
below). In Appendix D we present the actual days for which we have price 
information.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the listed companies and presents an ID number for 
each of them which are relevant for the presentation of the results below. Figure 2.4 
provides a brief overview of the stock prices of 3 companies listed at the SSE for the 
period 2010 (second half of 2010) and 2011.  
 
Returns and volatility 
The data for the stock returns from the published half-monthly reports contain 24 
observations per year, approximately two per month. We analyze the data for 2003 
to and including 2011, which gives 216 data points. We use the last observation of 
2002 to create the first returns observations for 2003. This database includes full 
information on the ten listed companies of interest, so we can also look at 
correlations across the returns. Appendix E indicates how stock returns are 
calculated at the SSE. 
 Before we perform various computations, we first carefully look at the data 
in the sense that we take care of re-alignments of stock prices. For example, 
Assuria’s stock price witnessed large changes in the level of the stock price on days 
58, 82 and 93, see Figure 2.5. On these days the returns take huge values. For parts 
of our analysis we decide to replace these exceptional returns by zero, and as such 
create corrected series (using the acronym _C). Note that for some analyses below 
we also consider the raw returns data including these outliers. We carry out such 
corrections for the data for the Surinam Bank, Elgawa, Hakrinbank and Self 
Reliance. We actively sought for explanations for these large returns, but we could 
not retrieve any useful information on this matter.  
 
Nominal Returns 
Table 2.2 presents some summary statistics of the data, and it is clear that negative 
returns are rare, and that there are many returns with value zero. The zero returns 
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data are not missing data, although they can be associated with no trade. Some series 
have only a few re-alignments, and then the returns have been set equal to zero for 
some analyses. Otherwise, it can also be that zero returns are apparently the actual 
output of the meeting of the traders. In the first column we see that average returns 
(with all zeroes included) range from 0.21% to 1.30%. The third column shows that 
the number of cases with only positive returns ranges from 11 (VSH Foods) to 98 
(The Surinam Bank). When we compute the average returns only for the cases when 
these returns are positive, we obtain mean returns ranging from 2.64% (Torarica) to 
6.22% (Elgawa). As compared with international stock market returns, these values 
seem to be rather modest.  
 Figure 2.6 presents an approximate index for the SSE. We created this 
index by summing the ten returns, where we thus assumed equal weights. The 
number of zero returns in the index is 17, and these zeroes do not appear in 
sequences but are all isolated observations. The creation of a market-value weighted 
index involves the collection of the market values. Although we do have access to 
various annual reports, we did not manage to collect them all, also as some 
companies did not have these in various years. We therefore stick to the analysis of 
an equally weighted index. Figure 2.7 presents a 24-period moving average of this 
index, which shows some cyclical patterns, with peaks in 2005 and 2008 and a 
recent dip in 2010. The average value of the index is 0.080% and the median is 
0.069%. This suggests that the stock market did not substantially increase nor 
decrease in the period of 2003 to 2011.  
 
Real Returns 
In the relevant appendix F we present the monthly inflation data. We use the 
inflation data to create real stock returns, where monthly inflation figures are used 
twice for the pairs of data that correspond with the relevant months. Figure 2.8 
displays the inflation data, and we can see that monthly inflation can be quite large, 
sometimes close to 5%.  
 Table 2.3 gives a statistical summary of the real returns. On average, the 
real returns for six stocks are negative, with VSH Foods having the most negative 
average (-0.827%). The amount of zeroes in the real returns is zero. The best 
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performing stock is that of the Surinam Brewery with an average real return of 
0.258%.  
 
Correlations 
Next, we consider the correlations between the returns of the ten stocks. As there are 
many returns that are equal to zero, we decide to resort to a simple counting method. 
In Table 2.4 we give the number of times that the returns of pairs of stocks are both 
positive. On the diagonal one finds the number of positive returns of each stock 
itself, and the off-diagonal cases give the similarity of stock returns.  
 To visualize the numbers in Table 2.4, we use basic correspondence 
analysis (Greenacre, 2007). The results are given in Figure 2.9. Stock returns R4 
(Elgawa) and R7 (Self Reliance) have large distances to the main cloud of points 
concerning stock returns R1, R3, R5, R8 and R10. So, Assuria, the Surinam Bank, 
Hakrinbank, the Surinam Brewery and Varossieau show similar behavior, that is, 
their stock prices move up often jointly, at least if they move up. 
 Table 2.5 presents similar numbers, but now concerning the data when pairs 
of stock returns are zero at the same time. This happens quite frequently as can be 
seen from the large numbers. Figure 2.10 visualizes these correlations, and now we 
see that Assuria (1) and the Surinam Bank (3) behave very different from the other 
eight stocks.  
 In sum, despite some marked differences concerning a few stocks, the 
tables and graphs for correlations show that there are quite some similarities across 
stock returns. This also supports our approach of taking an equal weighted average 
as an approximate index. 
 
Volatility 
In Table 2.6 we report the estimates of the relevant parameters in a GARCH (1,1) 
model (see Franses, 1998, Chapter 7, and the many references therein) for the two 
index series (with and without outlier removal). Such a GARCH model can be 
viewed as rather unreliable for data with many zeroes, so we do not consider this 
model for the individual series.  
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The estimation results in Table 2.6 suggest that equal-weighted stock index 
returns for the Suriname Stock Exchange have quite similar properties as those listed 
at USA or European stock markets. The parameters are estimated to be equal to 0.16 
(ARCH) and 0.81 (GARCH), respectively. Also for the index compiled from the raw 
data we get similar estimates.  
 
Weak-form efficiency 
Finally, we examine whether the SSE is weak-form efficient. First we consider the 
individual stocks, and lastly we look at the (approximate) index.  
 Table 2.7 presents the estimated p values of an F test on the joint 
significance of 5 lags in an autoregression of order 5. When the p value is small, for 
example, below 0.05, we find evidence that individual stock returns can be predicted 
from their own past. The bold face cases in Table 2.7 are concerned with such 
predictability, that is, the returns of CIC, Elgawa, Hakrinbank, VSH Foods and 
Varossieau are to some extent predictable. Such predictability disappears for CIC 
and Elgawa when we only consider the cases with positive returns.  
 Most importantly, when we consider our equal-weighted stock market 
index for the SSE, we see that this index is not predictable. 
 
Relation with other Latin American stock markets 
Latin American countries have achieved to amend their macroeconomic 
environment and institutions that engage with financial development. These changes 
were expected to develop stock markets in the region significantly (De la Torre an 
Schmukler, 2007). In addition, Latin American markets have great investment 
opportunities and thus generating regional hubs to attract foreign investors. This 
could create a regional effect in which investors invest in shares of countries that are 
close to each other. Therefore, dynamic correlations with other Latin American 
countries are considered. For the same years (2003-2011) we have collected daily 
data on the stock markets of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. We use only those days 
that correspond with the days presented in Appendix C. Table 2.8 present the leads 
(SSE leads other markets) and lags (SSE follows) correlations. For the lag selection 
is used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
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Basically, we observe that there are no significant cross correlations between the 
SSE and other stock markets. This is quite intriguing as the four Latin American 
stock markets do have positive cross correlations among each other (not reported). In 
sum, there is no relation between the stock market in Suriname and other important 
stock markets in the region.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we provided the first ever quantitative analysis of the stock returns of 
companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. We documented that average 
returns over the years 2003 to and including 2011 are not high, and that inflation-
corrected returns are often negative, on average across these years. We showed that 
stock returns patterns across the ten stocks have similar behavior in various 
dimensions, and that estimates of conditional volatility parameters for the index bear 
similarities with index returns in developed countries. One conclusion of our study is 
thus that the SSE index shows some signs of weak-form efficiency. However, the 
way the prices are set indicates some level of illiquidity in the market. Further, there 
are no designated market traders, and trades occur on average only twice a month 
with low volumes of such trades. But, even though the SSE is operationally 
inefficient, the time series properties of the index mimic those that are usually found 
in other stock markets. In sum, we conclude that there still is much more efficiency 
to be gained for the SSE.  
 This paper involved rather basic empirical analysis, but in our future work 
we plan to zoom into more detailed features of the SSE. One important issue is 
whether announcements made by the respective firms have an impact on returns and 
volatility. Also, we would like to examine if stock returns have predictive content for 
future economic growth.  
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Listed companies 
 
ID Company Sector, industry 
R1 Assuria Ltd.  Insurance 
R2 Consolidated Industries Corporation Ltd. Manufacturing 
R3 The Surinam Bank Banking 
R4 Elgawa Ltd. Services and Trading 
R5 Hakrinbank Ltd.  Banking 
R6 VSH Foods Manufacturing 
R7 The Surinam Insurance Company Insurance 
R8 The Surinam Brewery Manufacturing 
R9 The Torarica Group of Hotels Services 
R10 Varossieau Coating Industries Manufacturing 
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Table 2.2: Statistical summary of all returns in percentages 
(216 observations) and of the cases where the returns are 
positive 
 
 
All cases 
 
Cases with positive returns 
 
Mean Median 
 
Sample size 
 
Mean Median 
     
Assuria 1.14 0.00 
 
93 
 
2.65 2.02 
CIC 0.74 0.00 
 
29 
 
5.60 3.51 
DSB 1.16 0.00 
 
98 
 
2.98 2.31 
Elgawa 1.07 0.00 
 
37 
 
6.22 6.06 
Hakrinbank  0.61 0.00 
 
57 
 
2.78 2.28 
VSH Foods 0.21 0.00 
 
11 
 
4.14 3.92 
Self Reliance 0.59 0.00 
 
34 
 
5.85 5.13 
Surinam Brewery 1.30 0.00 
 
76 
 
3.69 2.00 
Torarica 0.59 0.00 
 
48 
 
2.64 1.35 
Varossieau 0.60 0.00 
 
34 
 
3.82 2.50 
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Table 2.3: Statistical summary of all real returns (216 
observations), that is, returns after correction for inflation 
 
    Mean    Median 
Assuria    0.102    -0.395 
CIC    -0.302    -0.450 
DSB    0.125    -0.270 
Elgawa    0.027    -0.410 
Hakrinbank   -0.431    -0.410 
VSH Foods   -0.827    -0.580 
Self Reliance   -0.452    -0.550 
Surinam Brewery   0.258    -0.390 
Torarica    -0.452    -0.424 
Varossieau   -0.437    -0.450 
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Table 2.4: Number of times (out of 216 cases) that the returns 
of stock a and of stock b are both positive. For example, in row 
2 column 3 we see that there are 11 observations where CIC 
(R2) and the Surinam Bank (R3) have positive returns. 
 
Assuria 93 9 51 22 24 4 7 36 26 17 
CIC 9 29 11 0 7 3 8 11 6 4 
DSB 51 11 98 16 28 7 12 36 25 17 
Elgawa 22 0 16 37 13 0 2 17 3 9 
Hakrinbank  24 7 28 13 57 9 12 25 16 12 
VSH Foods 4 3 7 0 9 11 3 3 6 3 
Self Reliance 7 8 12 2 12 3 33 10 6 3 
Surinam Brewery 36 11 36 17 25 3 10 76 23 14 
Torarica 26 6 25 3 16 6 6 23 48 8 
Varossieau 17 4 17 9 12 3 3 14 8 34 
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Table 2.5: Number of times (out of 216 cases) that the returns 
of stock a and of stock b are both zero. For example, in row 2 
column 3 we see that there are 98 observations where CIC (R2) 
and the Surinam Bank (R3) have zero returns. 
 
Assuria 123 102 75 108 89 116 91 83 101 106 
CIC 102 186 98 149 134 178 154 121 144 156 
DSB 75 98 117 95 87 113 90 77 94 101 
Elgawa 108 149 95 179 133 168 137 120 134 154 
Hakrinbank 89 134 87 133 157 155 128 106 125 135 
VSH Foods 116 178 113 168 155 205 166 132 163 174 
Self Reliance 91 154 90 137 128 166 172 111 136 142 
Surinam Brewery 83 121 77 120 106 132 111 140 115 120 
Torarica 101 144 94 134 125 163 136 115 168 142 
Varossieau 106 156 101 154 135 174 142 120 142 182 
 
 
Table 2.6: Estimates of parameters in GARCH models for SSE 
index returns (with standard errors in parentheses). The AR 
order is given in brackets.  
 
 
ARCH parameter 
 
GARCH parameter 
      Index, after correction [0] 0.162    (0.043) 
 
0.809    (0.039) 
Index [0] 0.072     (0.010) 
 
0.860     (0.018) 
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Table 2.7: Tests for efficiency (p values of the F test for the 
joint significance of five lags in an autoregression of order 5). 
We consider all data and only those cases where stock returns 
are positive. 
 
  
All cases 
 
Cases with positive returns 
     
Assuria  
 
0.110 
 
0.601 
CIC 
 
0.000 
 
0.374 
DSB 
 
0.593 
 
0.096 
Elgawa 
 
0.000 
 
0.672 
Hakrinbank 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
VSH Foods 
 
0.005 
 
0.017 
Self Reliance 
 
0.474 
 
0.236 
Surinam Brewery 
 
0.806 
 
0.780 
Torarica 
 
0.220 
 
0.349 
Varossieau 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
    Index 
 
0.160 
 
0.152 
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Table 2.8: Correlations between SSE equally weighted returns 
and other Latin American stock returns (Sample size is 216, 
meaning that correlations < -0.136 and > 0.136 are significant 
at the 5% level, indicated with an *) 
 
 
Leads 
 
0 
 
+1 
 
+2 
 
+3 
 
+4 
          Brazil  0.069 
 
0.022 
 
0.025 
 
0.011 
 
-0.045 
Chile  -0.063 
 
-0.039 
 
0.036 
 
0.081 
 
-0.111 
Mexico  0.094 
 
0.061 
 
-0.058 
 
0.016 
 
-0.062 
Peru  -0.002 
 
0.048 
 
-0.015 
 
0.020 
 
-0.139* 
          
          
 
Lags 
 
-1 
 
-2 
 
-3 
 
-4 
 
-5 
          Brazil  0.008 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.049 
Chile  -0.024 
 
0.032 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.168* 
 
0.006 
Mexico  -0.019 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.076 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.072 
Peru  0.036 
 
0.009 
 
0.000 
 
-0.070 
 
0.049 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1: GDP per capita Suriname at current prices for the 
period 2003-2012. 
Source: The World Bank (www. worldbank.org) 
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Figure 2.2: Average exchange rates Suriname for the period 2003-2012.  
Source: Central Bank of Suriname (www.cbvs.sr) 
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Figure 2.3: Imports and exports of goods and services of Suriname  
at current prices for the period 2003-2011.  
Source: www.unctad.org 
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Figure 2.4: Overview of stock prices of 3 companies listed at the SSE  
for the period 2010 (second half of 2010) and 2011.  
Source: Half monthly reports SSE. 
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Figure 2.5: Returns and corrected returns for Assuria 
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Figure 2.6: An index of returns on the Suriname stock exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: 24-period moving average 
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 Figure 2.8: Two-weekly inflation (based on monthly inflation figures) 
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Figure 2.9: Outcomes of correspondence analysis, when the data input is as 
in Table 2.4. The closer the points are in this figure, the more correlated are 
their respective returns data. The numbers associate with the stocks as they 
are is given in Table 2.1. 
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Figure 2.10: Outcomes of correspondence analysis, when the data input is as 
in Table 2.5. The closer the points are in this figure, the more correlated are 
their respective returns data. The numbers relate to the stocks as they are 
given in Table 2.1. 
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Appendixes of chapter 2 
 
Appendix A: Information about the listed companies 
 
At present, the number of listed companies at the SSE is 11. These companies are 
Assuria Ltd., Consolidated Industries Corporation Ltd., The Surinam Bank, Elgawa 
Ltd., Hakrinbank Ltd., VSH Foods Ltd., The Surinam Insurance Company Ltd., The 
Surinam Brewery Ltd., The Torarica Group of Hotels, Varossieau Coating Industries 
and VSH United. In addition, the State Oil Company of Suriname issued in 2010 
bonds to partially finance its investment program.  
 Assuria Ltd. (Assuria) is an insurance company and her history dates back 
to 1889. Through its subsidiaries, Assuria offers life and general insurances. Assuria 
is also a large institutional investor and is especially active in the field of mortgage 
loans and real estate development. Furthermore, she invests in the international 
capital market. As of December 2011, there are 181 employees employed at Assuria. 
 Consolidated Industries Corporation Ltd. (CIC), established in 1967, is a 
manufacturing company. Its commercial activities comprise of the production and 
distribution of powder detergents for household and industrial use and the 
production of plastic packaging materials. Throughout the years CIC has succeeded 
in achieving and holding the position as market leader in Suriname in a number of 
product groups. As of December 2011, there are 123 employees employed at CIC. 
 The Surinam Bank (DSB), which has been established shortly after the 
abolishment of slavery (1863), is in the banking industry and it is the largest 
commercial bank in Suriname. They offer services to both the business and private 
markets. For the reporting period 2011, there were 371 employees at DSB. 
 Elgawa Ltd. (Elgawa) is a private company categorized in the services and 
trading sector. Elgawa is specialized in electric engineering and installation.  
 Hakrinbank Ltd. (Hakrinbank) started its activities in June 1936 and is a 
commercial bank in Suriname. They offer financial services to both the business and 
private markets. As of December 2011, 278 employees are employed at Hakrinbank. 
VSH Foods Ltd., formerly known as Margarine, Fats and Oil Company Ltd. 
(Mavefa), has been established in 1960 and it is part of the VSH-United Group. VSH 
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Foods is a manufacturing company and its activities include the production and 
distribution of margarine, butter and other food components. Currently, the company 
counts 41 employees. 
 The Surinam Insurance Company Ltd. (Self Reliance), has been established 
in 1980, and it is an insurance company which offers various insurances packages. 
At the end of 2011, there were 130 individuals employed at Self Reliance.  
 The Surinam Brewery Ltd. has been established in 1955, and it is a 
manufacturing company. It brews, produces, sells and distributes alcoholic 
beverages. In addition, the brewery exports beer to various countries. At the end of 
2011, there were 96 individuals employed at the Surinam Brewery. 
 The Torarica Group of Hotels (Torarica), which was established in 1962, is 
in the services sector. Torarica offers hotel rooms and other facilities and is also 
specialized in arranging meetings and events. During the reporting year 2011-2012, 
Torarica has 359 employees. 
 Varossieau Coating Industries (Varossieau), has been established in 1959, 
and it is a manufacturing company and produces and sells paint and paint 
accessories. For the reporting period 2011, there are 62 employees. 
 Finally, the eleventh company listed at the SSE is VSH-United, which has 
been established in 1958. It is a group of companies headquartered in Suriname and 
the Group activities include shipping, trading, manufacturing, real estate 
development and management. Other associated companies are involved in 
insurance, banking and in the hospitality industry. VSH-United started its trading 
activities on the SSE as of January 2006. For the reporting period 2011, the Group 
employed 327 persons.  
For our analysis in this paper we aim to have the longest span of data 
possible. Except for VSH-United, we have data starting in 2003. Therefore, we 
analyze the stock returns of the first 10 companies. 
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Appendix B: Development of the Suriname Stock Exchange 
 
 
Table B1: Measures of stock market development 
 
Notes: 
Measures of stock market development are: number of companies listed and the 
MCAP/GDP ratio (represent stock market size). 
MCAP is defined as market capitalization and is calculated by the number of 
outstanding shares per stock multiplied by respective stock’s closing price.  
GDP is defined as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current local prices.  
According to these 2 measures, the SSE has not grown remarkably. 
* Due to data unavailability, estimated amounts of MCAP are produced. 
** GDP data derived from the World Bank and Central Bank of Suriname. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Number of 
listed 
companies 
MCAP **GDP current  
(SRD) 
MCAP/GDP 
2003 11  * 145.011.350  3.306.381.000 4% 
2004 10  * 263.692.633  4.057.509.000 6% 
2005 10  * 375.570.799  4.900.000.000 8% 
2006 11    371.276.669  7.206.000.000 5% 
2007 11    752.886.387  8.061.000.000 9% 
2008 11    565.890.210  9.698.000.000 6% 
2009 11    672.505.985 10.638.000.000 6% 
2010 11    977.743.599 11.989.000.000 7% 
2011 11 1.291.719.887 14.067.000.000 9% 
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Table B2: Measures of liquidity 
 
Notes: 
Measures of liquidity are: turnover/GDP and turnover ratio (Craigwell and Alleyne, 2004). 
Turnover is the market value of all traded shares during the year.  
Turnover ratio is calculated as Turnover/MCAP. 
The greater these two ratios the higher the liquidity but for the SSE this is not the case. 
* Due to data unavailability, estimated amounts are produced. 
(Source: half monthly reports SSE January 2003 – December 2011). 
 
  
Year Volume of 
shares 
traded 
Total value of 
shares traded 
(SRD) 
GDP current  
(SRD) 
Turn-
over/ 
GDP 
Turn-
over 
ratio 
2003 * 52.004 *225.019   3.306.381.000 0% 0.2% 
2004 * 27.169 *154.317   4.057.509.000 0% 0.1% 
2005  161.773   831.309   4.900.000.000 0% 0.2% 
2006 198.888 1.769.966   7.206.000.000 0% 0.5% 
2007 143.330 1.845.384   8.061.000.000 0% 0.2% 
2008 *11.172 * 175.853   9.698.000.000 0% 0.0% 
2009   36.640    753.483 10.638.000.000 0% 0.1% 
2010     7.920    208.116 11.989.000.000 0% 0.0% 
2011   14.416    562.796 14.067.000.000 0% 0.0% 
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Turnover (total shares traded) per company. 
Source: Annual reports 2011 and 2012 of the SSE. 
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Appendix C: Data in original format (an excerpt) 
 
Date Assuria C.I.C. DSB Elgawa 
05/1/2006 2.60 6.10 7.70 1.60 
19/1/2006  2.70 6.10 7.70 1.60 
02/2/2006 2.80 6.10 7.70 1.60 
16/2/2006 2.90 6.10 7.72 1.60 
02/3/2006 3.00 6.10 7.75 1.60 
16/3/2006 3.00 6.10 8.15 1.60 
23/3/2006 3.00 6.10 8.15 1.60 
06/4/2006 3.00 6.10 8.15 1.60 
20/4/2006 3.00 6.50 8.15 1.60 
04/5/2006 0.80 6.30 8.15 1.60 
18/5/2006 0.85 6.40 8.15 1.60 
01/6/2006 0.85 6.50 8.15 1.60 
15/6/2006 0.90 6.70 8.15 1.60 
06/7/2006 0.92 6.70 8.25 1.60 
20/7/2006  0.92 6.70 8.25 1.60 
03/8/2006 0.92 6.70 8.25 1.60 
17/8/2006 0.96 6.80 8.40 1.60 
07/9/2006 0.97 6.80 8.50 1.60 
21/9/2006 0.98 6.80 8.50 1.60 
05/10/2006 1.05 6.80 8.70 1.60 
19/10/2006 1.07 6.80 8.70 1.60 
19/10/2006 10.70 6.80 8.70 1.60 
2/11/2006 11.20 6.80 8.70 1.70 
16/11/2006 11.30 6.80 8.90 1.80 
07/12/2006 11.60 6.80 8.90 1.80 
21/12/2006 11.60 6.80 9.00 1.80 
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Appendix D: The days with stock price information  
 
 
Years 
Month 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
          January 9, 23 8, 22 6, 20 5, 19 4, 18 3, 17 8, 22 7, 21 6, 20 
February 6, 20 5, 19 3, 17 2, 16 1, 15 7, 21 5, 19 4, 18 10, 24 
March 6, 20 4, 18 3, 17 2, 16 1, 15 6, 20 5, 19 4, 18 10, 24 
April 3, 17 1, 15 7, 21 6, 20 5, 19 3, 17 2, 16 1, 15 7, 21 
May 8, 22 6, 20 5, 19 4, 18 3, 17 8, 22 7, 21 6, 20 5, 19 
June 12, 26 3, 17 2, 16 1, 15 7, 21 12, 26 4, 18 3, 17 2, 16 
July 3, 17 8, 22 7, 21 6, 20 5, 19 3, 17 2, 16 8, 22 7, 21 
August 7, 21 5, 19 4, 18 3, 17 2, 16 7, 21 6, 20 5, 19 4, 18 
September 4, 18 2, 23 1, 15 7, 21 6, 20 4, 18 3, 17 2, 16 1, 15 
October 2, 16 7, 10 6, 20 5, 19 4, 18 2, 16 1, 15 7, 21 6, 20 
November 6, 20 4, 18 10, 17 2, 16 1, 15 6, 20 5, 19 4, 18 3, 17 
December 4, 18 2, 16 1, 15 7, 21 6, 20 4, 18 3, 17 2, 16 1, 15 
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Appendix E: Calculation of stock returns  
 
According to the Exchange regulations including addendum (SSE, 2007), stock 
returns are calculated the following way: 
1. Purchase orders, no trading 
All purchase orders are sorted based on the price. The order with the 
highest price follows first. Subsequently, the cumulative sales are 
determined per order from high to low until it exceeds the amount of SRD 
6.000. The new price is the price of the order that leads to crossing the 
amount of SRD 6.000, provided that this price is higher than the previous 
closing price. If that is not the case, than the previous closing price remains 
valid. 
When no actual trading takes place and the total sales of unfilled buy and 
sell orders remains below the amount of SRD 6.000, the closing price on 
the previous trading day will be maintained (because of the small size). 
 
2. Trading, no outstanding purchase orders 
The traded orders are sorted based on the price. The order with the highest 
price follows first. Subsequently, the cumulative sales are determined per 
order from high to low until it exceeds the amount of SRD 3.500. The new 
price is the price of the order that leads to crossing the amount of SRD 
3.500, provided that this price is higher than the previous closing price. If 
that is not the case, than the previous closing price remains valid. 
 
3. Trading, with outstanding purchase orders 
The traded orders are sorted based on the price. The order with the highest 
price follows first. Subsequently, the cumulative sales are determined per 
order from high to low until it exceeds the amount of SRD 3.500. The new 
price is the price of the order that leads to crossing the amount of SRD 
3.500, provided that this price is higher than the previous closing price. If 
that is not the case, than the previous closing price remains valid. 
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If the total turnover value remains under the amount of SRD 3.500 (with 
actual trading of securities in any fund), the closing price on the previous 
trading day will be maintained because of the small size.  
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Appendix F: Data on inflation 
 
 
Year 
Month 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
          January 1.94 0.41 0.78 1.29 1.28 1.78 1.30 0.20 3.54 
February 1.01 0.41 0.06 1.15 0.05 0.36 1.08 0.39 4.53 
March 3.26 0.41 0.12 0.16 0.25 1.83 0.10 0.29 2.37 
April 2.52 0.45 0.24 0.36 1.59 3.63 0.40 0.58 1.84 
May 1.09 1.84 0.65 0.21 2.79 1.48 1.68 2.40 0.31 
June 0.41 1.18 0.65 1.71 2.48 2.37 0.60 2.54 0.39 
July 0.41 0.25 1.05 0.10 0.88 1.38 0.20 0.37 0.70 
August 0.41 0.55 1.33 1.37 0.33 1.20 1.40 0.55 0.23 
September 0.41 0.87 4.62 1.50 0.05 0.08 1.28 1.27 0.23 
October 0.41 1.04 4.47 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.58 1.08 0.54 
November 0.41 1.28 1.04 0.39 1.26 3.17 0.19 0.62 0.08 
December  0.41 0.30 0.31 0.29 1.43 1.52 0.58 0.35 0.31 
 
Source: General Bureau of Statistics of Suriname. For the years 2003-2008, the inflation 
figures concern Paramaribo and Wanica. For the years 2009-2011, the figures concern 
Paramaribo, Wanica, Nickerie, Saramacca, Coronie and Commewijne. Due to fire, no data 
were available for July 2003 to March 2004, for which we have used the data of June 2003. 
In January 2009 the base year was changed. We replaced the original inflation rate (57.76) 
by a new value which is the average of December 2008 and February 2009.  
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Chapter 3 
Size and value effects in Suriname 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the link between stock returns and size and book-to-market equity 
effects for the ten companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. We analyze the 
cross-sectional variation in average returns and we find that there is apparently no 
size effect, but there is a value effect. The findings are broadly in line with those for 
other emerging markets documented in the literature. 
 
 
A first version of this chapter appeared as Bodeutsch, D., & Franses Ph.H.B.F. (2013), Size and value 
effects in Suriname (No. EI 2013-31). Econometric Institute Research Papers (pp. 1-17), Erasmus School 
of Economics. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Emerging markets have grown rapidly and have received much attention in the past 
years. According to Barry et al. (1998) and Fama and French (1998), these markets 
are generally related to high returns and high volatility. Hence, there is a growing 
interest for factors determining stock returns on emerging markets. 
Prior studies concerning the determinants of stock returns in developed markets 
(largely limited to the US) have produced results in which a number of firm-specific 
factors contribute in explaining the cross-section of average returns. Banz (1981) 
presents, in perhaps the first relevant empirical paper, evidence on the relation 
between (firm size) and US stock returns. Stattman (1980) and Chan et al. (1991) 
find a positive relation between the book-to-market equity ratio of a company and 
the average returns on US and Japanese stocks. Fama and French (1992) provide 
evidence that a combination of size (ME) and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) is 
better able to capture the cross section of stock returns than the market betas alone. 
In addition, Basu (1983) finds a positive relation between earnings-to-price ratio 
(E/P) and the average returns on US stocks.  
These studies indicate that the average returns of small stocks are higher 
than those of large stocks (known as the size effect), and that stocks with high 
BE/ME and E/P ratios have on average higher returns than stocks with low ratios. 
This is called the value effect.  
For emerging markets, a number of empirical studies have also 
demonstrated that size and value factors play a significant role in explaining the 
performance of stock returns; see, for example, Fama and French (1998); Claessens 
et al. (1998) and Barry et al. (2002). 
In this paper, we investigate whether size and value effects play a major 
role in explaining the behavior of stock returns, where we focus on the Suriname 
Stock Exchange (SSE), a stock exchange that has never been analyzed as such. The 
SSE is a young and growing market in the Caribbean area, where Suriname is 
located north of Brazil and is bordered by Guyana and French Guyana to the west 
and east, respectively. The SSE represents an underdeveloped market as compared to 
developed markets and various other emerging markets, due to relatively limited 
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trading and a small number of listed companies. The market is also quite illiquid. For 
more details, see Bodeutsch and Franses (2012).  
Our study builds on the research of Fama and French (1992), where we 
investigate the relation between stock returns and size (ME), book-to-market equity 
ratio (BE/ME), and earnings-to-price ratio (E/P). We extend the empirical evidence 
on emerging markets to Suriname using data of ten of the listed companies (for 
which we could collect the data) of the SSE for the period 2003 to and including 
2012. These accounting variables, that is, market value of equity, book-to-market 
equity and earnings-price ratios, seem to be able to capture the cross-sectional 
variation in average returns, even though they have some peculiar properties (as we 
will discuss in the ‘Data Analysis’ section). The results are broadly in line with those 
for other emerging markets documented in the literature. As a courtesy to the reader, 
we present the data in the Appendix, as these data have never been compiled and 
published before.  
The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some 
elements of the relevant literature on size and value effects of a number of developed 
and emerging stock markets. In Section 3, we describe the data collection and in 
Section 4 we turn to the data analysis. We conclude with a discussion and the main 
implications from our study. 
 
3.2 Relevant literature 
 
The seminal study by Fama and French (1992) presents evidence that the factors size 
(market capitalization, ME) and book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) have 
explanatory value for the cross-section of returns on US stocks. These factors are 
capable of explaining variation in returns beyond market risk. They examined the 
combined role of market beta (β), ME, E/P, leverage and BE/ME in the cross-section 
of average returns of US stocks in the period 1963 to and including 1990. The results 
indicate a negative relation between ME and average stock returns. With regard to 
BE/ME, E/P and the average returns, there is a positive relation, implying that high 
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BE/ME and high E/P stocks have higher average returns than stocks that are low on 
BE/ME and E/P.  
Fama and French (1998) extend this type of research to other developed 
countries with major markets and also to developing countries with emerging stock 
markets, where they address the sample-specific nature of their results. Interestingly, 
the negative relationship between size and stock returns is also found in emerging 
markets, that is, stocks of small firms have higher average returns than stocks of 
large firms. Furthermore, the authors document international evidence which 
captures the value premium in stock returns generated by BE/ME, E/P, C/P and 
Div/P (the ratio of dividends over price). Fama and French (1998) report that the 
value premium is a compensation for risk associated with relative distress. Hence, 
firms with high BE/ME, E/P, C/P and Div/P, which are also known as value firms 
(firms in distress and poor earnings), have high average returns. At the same time, 
firms with low BE/ME, E/P, C/P and Div/P, which are labeled as growth firms 
(firms with high earnings), have lower average returns.  
Claessens et al. (1998) study the relationship between stock market returns 
and size and value effects using cross-sectional stock returns from 19 emerging 
markets for the period 1986 to 1993. Some of the results presented in this study are 
in contrast with the results documented for developed markets. Remarkably, in 11 of 
the 19 studied markets, it is found that size is positively related to stock returns, 
meaning that stocks of larger firms create higher returns. They also documented 
evidence of BE/ME effects, but the direction is also often opposite to the results of 
Fama and French (1998). With regard to E/P, for six of the markets, it has a positive 
effect on stock returns, and this is on par with the results of Fama and French (1992), 
while for the remaining 13 markets, no significant relation is found between E/P and 
stock returns. 
Barry et al. (2002) indicate in their research that the legitimacy of size and 
value effects based on BE/ME has been disputed by a number of authors. Some of 
the discussions are whether such effects hold generally or whether they are specific 
for the chosen sample or due to the different methodologies employed. Hence, these 
authors examine the robustness of the size and value effects using a sequence of 
different methodologies. This results in new evidence on the size and BE/ME effects 
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in 35 emerging markets for the period 1985 to 2000. Their evidence strongly 
supports the presence of a book-to market effect of the same kind as in other 
markets, but the evidence is considerably weaker for the size effect. 
Recently, Borys and Zemčik (2011) focus on the occurrence of size and 
value effects on emerging stock markets in the Visegrad countries. Following Barry 
et al. (2002), they also raise some issues to define the behavior of stock market 
returns. The issues stated are whether the size and value effects are an international 
development and not confined to the United States and whether the relationship 
among stock returns and size and value factors has a global or country-specific 
character. Their results indicate that size and book-to-market equity do have an 
effect on stock returns, albeit that the effects are smaller than those obtained in Fama 
and French (1998). 
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
Our study uses data from ten of the listed companies of the SSE from 2003 to 2012, 
and these are the ten for which we could collect data. For two other companies, there 
were too many missing data. Whereas financial data of emerging stock markets is 
widely available, data on the SSE is not easily accessible. It took us half a year to 
collect the data, which was mainly due to the fact that we had to personally collect 
the annual reports, which are not always publicly available. The returns data are 
derived from the half-monthly reports of the SSE which are the result of a manual 
trading system; see Bodeutsch and Franses (2012). The data to construct the firm-
specific factors are derived from the companies’ annual reports. Due to the public 
unavailability, the annual reports (2003–2011) were collected in various different 
ways. We contacted the listed companies, we consulted the companies’ websites (if 
available) and we collected data straight from the SSE. Also, it turned out to be 
possible to obtain certain annual reports from the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Suriname. 
 We use market capitalizations to create the size factor. Size (ME) is 
calculated by the number of shares outstanding multiplied by a stock’s closing price. 
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The firm-specific factors that we analyze to examine the value effect are the book-to-
market equity ratio and the earnings-to-price ratio (the inverse of price-to-earnings 
ratio). Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) is the ratio of the book value of common 
equity to its market value and earnings-to-price (E/P) is the ratio of earnings per 
share to a stock’s closing price. 
 In Figures 3.1–3.5, we provide an overview of the development of the stock 
prices, market value, book value, book-to-market equity ratio and earnings per share 
of the ten companies listed on the SSE for the period 2003 to 2012. As a courtesy to 
the reader, we provide the data we collected in the Data Appendix. An ‘NA’ denotes 
a missing value. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Closing stock prices of 10 companies listed on the SSE in 
local currency (SRD) for the end period 2003-2012.  
Source: Half monthly reports SSE 
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Figure 3.2: Market value (ME) of the stocks of 10 companies listed on 
the SSE in local currency (SRD) for the end period 2003-2011. 
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Figure 3.3: Book value of 10 companies listed on the SSE in local currency 
(SRD) for the end period 2003-2011. 
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Figure 3.4: Book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) of 10 companies listed 
on the SSE for the end period 2003-2011. 
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Figure 3.5: Earnings per share in local currency (SRD) for 10 companies 
listed on the SSE for the end period 2003-2011. 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
We have annual data on 10 stocks for the end period 2003 to and including 2012. 
For each year T, we run the familiar regression 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖,𝑇 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖,𝑇−1 = 𝛼𝑇 + 𝛽1,𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑇−1 + 𝛽2,𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑇−1
𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑇−1
+ 𝛽3,𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑇−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇 
(1) 
 
 
where log denotes the natural logarithm and where i = 1,2,..,10, and P is the stock 
price, ME is market value (size), BE is book value and EPS is earnings per share. We 
have no data on dividend payments, so this variable is not included.  
 We have collected data for ten listed firms for the years 2003 to and 
including 2012. Due to the time lag, we lose 2003 as it is the first T-1 observation. 
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For the years 2003-2004 there are some missing data for the Surinamese Brewery 
and for CIC, and for the years 2003-2005, data are missing for Elgawa; see the Data 
Appendix. In Table 3.1, we will each time present the actual sample size used. 
 
Table 3.1: Estimation results (White-corrected) standard 
errors in parentheses for each of the years 2003 to 2012.  
  
α   β1 β2 β3 R
2
 
Year 
      2012 
 
-1.034 0.074 0.175 0.036 0.639 
  
 (1.179)  (0.069)  (0.168)  (0.032) 
 
 
      2011  -1.226 0.077 -0.102 0.037 0.544 
   (1.269)  (0.075)  (0.233)  (0.044)  
       
2010  -1.533 0.118 1.029 -0.154 0.492 
  (2.502) (0.151) (0.651) (0.113)  
       
2009 
 
-0.921 0.060 0.121 0.042 0.632 
  
 (0.457)  (0.027)  (0.088)  (0.038) 
 
 
      2008 
 
1.101 -0.059 0.188 -0.035 0.524 
  
 (1.358)  (0.082)  (0.154)  (0.059) 
 
 
      2007 
 
-2.696 0.185 0.531 -0.105 0.286 
  
 (3.960)  (0.248)  (0.334)  (0.120) 
 
 
      2006 
 
-5.361 0.338 0.297 -0.066 0.445 
(sample is 9)  (3.761)  (0.233)  (0.224)  (0.074) 
 
 
      2005 
 
2.767 -0.169 -0.152 0.039 0.312 
(sample is 7)  (3.081)  (0.194)  (0.423)  (0.120) 
 
 
      2004 
 
-1.070 0.089 0.560 0.197 0.662 
(sample is 7)  (3.183)  (0.199)  (0.339)  (0.112) 
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Based on Fama and French (1992), we would expect β1 in (1) to be 
negative, β2 to be positive and β3 to be positive too. Table 3.1 presents the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) based on estimation results for each of the years 2012–2004. 
We see diversity of parameter estimates, where sometimes estimates are positive, 
sometimes negative and, in many cases, insignificant. However, when we consider 
all equations as being part of a larger system, as in Table 3.2, we observe that the 
estimate of β2 has the expected sign, is significant, and has a value which is quite 
close to the value in Table III of Fama and French (1992). 
 
Table 3.2: estimation results (White-corrected) standard errors 
in parentheses for two systems of equations (in boldface and 
italics are the 5% significant parameter estimates) 
 
α   
 
β1 
 
β2 
 
β3 
        System 1 
  
0.063 
 
0.262 
 
-0.016 
   
(0.049) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.029) 
 
       System 2 -0.897 
 
0.068 
 
0.298 
 
-0.025 
 
(0.792) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.028) 
 
Notes to table 3.2: Systems 1 and 2 assume that the parameters in (1) are equal 
across equations. System 1 sets the intercept term equal to 0, while System 2 allows 
it to be equal across equations.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper has considered the ten foremost important companies in Suriname, their 
stock market performance and the link between that performance and fundamentals. 
Using the approach of Fama and French (1992), we have found that there is 
apparently no size effect, but there is a value effect. Book-to-market equity 
(BE/ME), which is the ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value 
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has the expected positive effect on stock returns. This ratio acts as a measure for past 
performance. Companies with a high BE/ME ratio (known as value firms) are related 
to poor performance in the past (low stock prices, poor earnings, and distress). So, 
also in Suriname, value firms have high stock returns which can be seen as an 
important factor for the Surinamese market and ultimately the investor. We could not 
find any significant size effects in Suriname, but this may also be due to the small 
sample. Anyway, the sign of the size effects is different than usually encountered (as 
it is positive), and this corroborates well with the findings in related studies on 
emerging markets. 
The implications of our study are the following. Up until now, the SSE has 
not been fully considered as a source of capital. However, Suriname can benefit from 
the evidence of our study for the following reasons. Fama and French (1992) and 
others report that size and book-to-market equity are considered as variables which 
can provide information from stock prices about risk and expected returns. Value 
and growth are two fundamentals for stock selection and these reported variables can 
thus be useful. Value firms are perceived as underpriced firms (cheap stocks) and not 
appreciated by the market. If the Surinamese market realizes that the prospects of 
value firms are not as weak as proposed by the developments in the recent past, the 
stock price will increase and this in turn could result in investors gaining an interest 
in those firms. Value investors have been rewarded with a large risk premium. 
In addition, value firms not listed on the SSE, seeking capital to finance 
their growth, can be motivated to be listed on the SSE. According to the indicators’ 
size (measured by the number of companies listed and the MCAP/GDP ratio) and 
liquidity (measured by turnover/GDP and turnover ratio), the SSE has not grown 
remarkably in the past years (see Bodeutsch and Franses, 2012). As a result, these 
firms can ensure that the number of firms listed on the SSE increases. However, in 
order to stimulate the development of the SSE, which can propel economic growth, 
the Surinamese government should facilitate better stock market performance 
through, for example, improved disclosure requirements and settlement procedures. 
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Data Appendix chapter 3 
 
Stock prices 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
          
Varossieau 6.75 8 9 9 16 16.6 16.6 16.85 22 27.5 
Self 
Reliance 1.82 9.2 9.3 8.6 8.6 9.1 9.5 11 11 18 
VSH Foods 3.7 4.95 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.45 5.6 5.6 5.6 6.1 
Surinam  
Brewery 
28.82 35 51 73 98 125 225 290 395 735 
CIC 2.25 3.25 6.1 6.8 6.8 8 8 8 8.25 9 
DSB 5 7.3 7.68 9 47.25 20 25.5 40 71 96.75 
Elgawa 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.8 6 8 8 60 60 150 
Assuria 4.7 5.5 2.5 11.6 15.5 19.05 22.25 30 46 78 
Hakrinbank 79.2 106 124 136 150 174 190 205 225 295 
Torarica 19 24.5 27.5 36.6 39.22 42 57 58 65.3 70 
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Market value 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        
 
2341642 2775280 3122190 3122190 10830528 11236672 11236672 11405899 14891976 
2373309 11996947 16746510 15487662 15487662 16388108 17108464 19809801 19809801 
4823690 6453315 6779240 6779240 6779240 7105165 7300720 7306320 7306320 
NA NA 4837860 6924780 9296280 11857500 21343500 27509400 37469700 
NA NA 30512420 34014960 34014960 40017600 40017600 40017600 41268150 
43600000 63656000 66969600 78480000 411547500 174200000 222105000 348400000 618410000 
NA NA NA 862380 2874600 3832800 3832800 5585634 5584800 
25304635 88835450 161518750 74957228 101410765 124843641 145820069 196611330 301474754 
36883123 49363776 57746304 63334656 69854400 81031104 88482240 95467680 104781600 
18430000 24354715 27336925 48510372 51982972 55667640 75548940 76874360 86549926 
 
Note: the rows associate with the same companies as in the table for Stock Prices. 
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Book value 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        
 
3084924 3630388 4250824 5729473 6121734 6586155 12032489 14344903 13174685 
10130094 11805245 22698604 20165479 23521840 26737283 31145748 39065202 53495906 
6841781 7020062 7171736 5798243 6004422 6191081 7117852 7758999 8307928 
NA NA 33567203 36408324 38455695 41704028 40431586 46816832 49223455 
NA NA 8939000 10126000 11048000 12093000 20304000 21375000 20650017 
26776000 48560000 59947000 73300000 94335000 111015000 125395000 150111000 180148000 
NA NA NA 7887000 9256000 9691000 10449000 12669000 NA 
34645000 58040000 69197425 89135891 106817961 120566494 137376595 160826106 202951935 
11971828 15543068 21230689 33237684 43305390 54471081 75371359 88325937 109275975 
26706000 28267000 35189978 47135227 50141539 53767118 56271051 58231951 60765027 
 
Note: the rows associate with the same companies as in the table for Stock Prices. 
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Book-to-market equity ratio 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        
 
1.32  1.31  1.36  1.84  0.57  0.59  1.07  1.26  0.88  
4.27  0.98  1.36  1.30  1.52  1.63  1.82  1.97  2.70  
1.42  1.09  1.06  0.86  0.89  0.87  0.97  1.06  1.14  
NA NA 6.94  5.26  4.14  3.52  1.89  1.70  1.31  
NA NA 0.29  0.30  0.32  0.30  0.51  0.53  0.50  
0.61  0.76  0.90  0.93  0.23  0.64  0.56  0.43  0.29  
NA NA NA 17.66  12.74  11.64  3.73  3.19  NA 
1.37  0.65  0.43  1.19  1.05  0.97  0.94  0.82  0.67  
0.32  0.31  0.37  0.52  0.62  0.67  0.85  0.93  1.04  
1.45  1.16  1.29  0.97  0.96  0.97  0.74  0.76  0.70  
 
Note: the rows associate with the same companies as in the table for Stock Prices. 
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Earnings per share 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        
 
1.06 2.37 2.59 4.23 2.99 3.29 4.26 6.14 0.99 
3.32 1.54 1.97 1.93 1.34 2.02 2.69 5.11 7.55 
0.26 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.3 0.28 1.19 0.81 0.73 
42.97 55.92 77.91 118.83 138.79 186.94 197.59 274.25 327.09 
NA NA 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.23 1.18 0.37 0.06 
0.31 0.45 1.65 1.88 10.3 2.61 2.4 3.15 4.1 
NA NA NA 2.48 3.54 1.66 2.08 25.26 NA 
0.22 1.12 0.47 1.86 1.91 1.63 2.41 2.89 3.79 
7.87 11.79 18.2 27.41 32.84 36.15 39.06 42.74 53.8 
1.48 1.84 2.54 2.01 3.14 3.52 2.41 1.56 1.24 
 
Note: the rows associate with the same companies as in the table for Stock Prices. 
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Chapter 4 
Risk attitudes in company boardrooms in a country 
with an 
emerging economy: 
An empirical study for Suriname 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We test risk attitude and risk propensity of executive and non-executive directors of 
almost all (read: ten) companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. This stock 
exchange associates with an emerging market, which currently seems to be at its 
initial stage. With a personalized survey we collect data for 13 members in the board 
room. The sample size is small as the population is small, but still we can test 
various hypotheses that are put forward in the literature. Our main finding is that the 
differences between risk attitudes of board members of companies in a country with 
a developing economy do not differ tremendously from those of board members in 
countries with developed economies. 
 
 
A first version of this chapter appeared as Bodeutsch, D., & Franses Ph.H.B.F. (2015), Risk attitudes in 
company boardrooms in a developing country: An empirical study for Suriname (No. EI 2015-04). 
Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus School of Economics. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The decisions of the members of the board of a company have a strong effect on the 
performance of a company. Members like the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and also members of supervisory boards exercise 
impact on the total performance of a company. This corresponds with the upper 
echelons perspective which argues that company performance is a reflection of its 
top managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Various aspects of (supervisory) board 
membership are the focus of many recent studies, where bonuses, incentives and for 
example risk attitudes attract much attention. With regard to risk attitudes, key 
stakeholders now require from companies in all sectors to clearly express the degree 
of their willingness to take risk. In the present study we also consider risk attitudes, 
where we specifically focus on board members of companies in a developing and 
emerging economy. Indeed, most if not all research focuses on westernized 
companies, also as the relevant data are perhaps more easily available. In our present 
study we encounter data issues, as we can only interview 13 board members, simply 
as there are not that many more, but then still, we examine their risk attitudes and are 
able to highlight a few noticeable outcomes. As far as we know, this is the first ever 
study that measures risk attitudes of leading directors in a developing economy.  
Board room behavior and dynamics in the inner process of the board room 
has been the subject of much recent research (see for example De Groot et al. 2012 
and their list of references, Herrmann and Datta 2005, Jensen and Zajac 2004, 
amongst many others). In companies there are a multitude of factors such as 
characteristics of individuals, roles and organizational situations which all can 
influence decision making of top executives. In addition, essential for executives 
performance is the responsibility to undertake investments with which risk is 
associated. These elements of decision making, together with various industrial and 
environmental factors, result in a company’s performance (Hambrick, 2007).  
Many authors use demographic characteristics of top executives as proxies 
for their knowledge base, cognitive orientation and risk attitudes. These proxies are 
used to explain (or correlate with) the strategic choices of executives, performance 
levels or any stock exchange outcome (De Groot et al. 2012). A great deal of the 
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empirical literature on executive demographic characteristics, (strategic) decision-
making and company performance has been grounded in the upper echelons theory 
advocated by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Hambrick and Mason (1984) indicate 
that demographic traits such as gender, age, educational level and functional 
background experiences shape the values and beliefs of top executives and can be 
seen as legitimate proxies for underlying cognitive abilities, knowledge and values 
and which, in turn, impact behavior and (strategic) decision-making. Whereas the 
upper echelons theory accentuates the role of demography-based preferences, the 
agency theory emphasizes the role of position-based preferences (Jensen and Zajac, 
2004). Thus, according to the agency theory, the role in the board also has an impact 
on decision making of top executives. We investigate both demography and 
professional role in our study. 
Adams et al. (2010) imply that much of the literature on board 
characteristics is directed towards Anglo-American companies and hence studies on 
boards in non-Anglo-American companies have been underexplored. Setiyono and 
Tarazi (2004) argue that only few companies from the latter type of companies 
provide information on board members to the public. For our study, we decided to 
interview various board members of key Surinamese companies as we believe it is 
interesting to analyze the risk attitudes of boardroom members of the Surinamese 
companies who are listed on the Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE). Furthermore, in 
Suriname the two-tier board system is often employed which is known as a system 
with an insider managerial board (executive directors) and an outsider supervisory 
board (non-executive directors). In addition, while most studies of companies’ 
executives and decision making have tended to focus either on the CEO or CFO 
(executive directors), we extend the arguments to include non-executive directors 
(NEDs). Hence, in this paper we study the influence of various characteristics, like 
age, functional experience, professional role, over(confidence) of executive and non-
executive directors, and the way they operate in a two-tier board, on their risk 
attitude in the decision making process.  
We use a survey-based approach (executed as a structured interview) to 
provide insight into the people behind the decisions taken in the companies listed at 
the SSE. The Surinamese context in the sense of cultural differences influences the 
68 
 
way people engage in doing business, thus offering an opportunity to enhance our 
understanding of the risk attitudes of top executives in an emerging economy. We 
utilize the survey proposed by De Groot et al. (2012) and adapt it to the Surinamese 
situation. Our survey harvests information of various characteristics (demographic, 
personality and company), information related to the role the respondent has in the 
boardroom and information regarding investment decisions. During the interview, 
tailor made investment scenarios are presented to the respondents. This approach 
differs from De Groot et al. (2012), who use a dynamic web-page to tailor each 
survey to the respondent, thereby automating certain aspects of the structured 
interview. However, with the limited number of respondents but also the limited 
responses on the investment scenarios, we are not able to analyze the scenarios in 
detail. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we 
describe the relevant theory and research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data 
collection and in Section 4 we present the results of our analyses. Finally, we 
conclude with a discussion of the main findings. 
 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
To guide our empirical analysis we first review available theory and from that we 
generate a few hypotheses.  
The explicit acknowledgement of risk when running companies has been 
significant in recent years as the consequences of risky decisions have become more 
noticeable (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Decision making under risk is an essential part 
of the job of top executives and it implies that their decisions affect their companies 
and environment. An individual’s personal experience or beliefs about risk has an 
impact on the view how a decision maker assesses and reacts to risk, which is 
usually labeled as risk attitude. The general tendency of the decision maker to take or 
to avoid risk is referred to by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) as the decision maker’s risk 
propensity and is according to Papadakis and Barwise (2002) the most widely used 
CEO characteristic. One way to measure this propensity is presented by 
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MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) as a measure of willingness to take risk. Various 
characteristics (both demographic and personality characteristics) can be viewed as a 
signal for an executives’ risk propensity or willingness to take risk. In addition, an 
individual’s risk tolerance i.e. the amount of risk an individual is comfortably willing 
to take, is also important when analyzing risk attitudes. 
 Much empirical literature on executive demographic traits and 
organizational outcomes has been grounded in the upper echelon theory of Hambrick 
and Mason (1984). The theory states that organizational outcomes, that is, strategic 
choices and company performance, can be partially predicted from executives’ 
observable (demographic) characteristics such as age, education, and functional 
background experiences. Furthermore, most upper echelon studies are related to 
chief executive characteristics (CEO) as a result of the power he/she possesses in 
most companies (Hambrick and Mason 1984, Herrmann and Datta 2005). However, 
executive and non-executive directors are part of each other’s decision context 
(Jensen and Zajac, 2004), and therefore when examining top level decision making it 
makes sense to study the decision processes of all the members of a board. Graham 
et al. (2013) explain that CEOs and CFOs have different personal characteristics and 
career paths and they also differ in terms of attitudes and this has an effect on 
decision making. Ultimately, it is the board of directors consisting of executive and 
non-executive directors who determines how to allocate resources, that is, to 
participate in (risky) investments and this in turn depends on their risk attitude and 
the willingness to take risk. 
Therefore, in our study we also will use demographic characteristics, which 
in our case will be age and functional background experience as proxies for risk 
attitudes of board members (executive and non-executive directors). 
 
Age 
Age can be considered as both a proxy for an individual’s risk propensity and for the 
extent of experience (Dohmen et al., 2011, Herrmann and Datta, 2005). An 
executive’s age can influence decisions or choices in important ways. Age has been 
found to be negatively related with regard to the capability to incorporate new 
information and to make risky decisions (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). According to 
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De Groot et al. (2012), the negative relationship between age and the willingness to 
take risk has widely been recognized. Younger CEOs may be less risk averse, while 
older executives shall be more concerned about career and financial security and 
consequently be more inclined to avoid riskier projects (Graham et al., 2013, 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). However, age can also reflect experience and a 
different outlook, allowing executives to take more risks (Graham et al., 2013). In 
addition, experience could make executives less cautious to the risks underlying the 
individual decisions. Thus, we stipulate  
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Younger executives are more willing to take risk. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
More experienced executives are more willing to take risk.  
 
Functional background experience 
According to Jensen and Zajac (2004), functional background experience has 
extensively been referred to as the demographic characteristic to influence company 
performance. Hence, in our study the emphasis is on finding a relationship between 
functional background experience and the risk attitude of top executives. Each 
executive has specific experience in some functional field and this may shape 
decision making. The functional background experience, like accounting, finance, 
legal, or marketing/sales, is found to have a direct impact on the way business 
problems are determined, on how information is processed, and on how strategic 
preferences are made by executives (Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Within a group of 
executives with different functional backgrounds each of them will approach and 
analyze a problem to a large extent in terms of the objectives and activities of their 
own respective domains (Dearborn and Simon, 1958). In addition, functional 
background experience may serve as an indicator for an individual’s risk propensity. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) classify functional backgrounds in marketing/ sales, 
product R&D and entrepreneurship as so-called ‘output’ backgrounds and 
backgrounds in production, accounting/ finance and process R&D as ‘throughput’ 
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backgrounds. Individuals operating within these areas are likely to have different 
perspectives on the company and its environment. To assess the type of functional 
background depends on the contextual relation purporting that output backgrounds 
are related to contexts characterized by greater uncertainty and ambiguity (Herrmann 
and Datta, 2005). Jensen and Zajac (2004) document that firms led by executives 
with functional background experiences in finance are more likely to pursue growth 
through acquisitions and diversification. This leads us to put forward the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: 
Executives with output backgrounds are more willing to take risk. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: 
Executives with output backgrounds are more likely to engage in R&D investments. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: 
Executives with output backgrounds are more likely to engage in investments related 
to expansion into new markets. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
Firms with more finance executives are more likely to engage in acquisition 
investment activities. 
 
Role-dependent risk attitudes 
As opposed to upper echelons theory with its demographically based preferences, 
agency theory focuses on the different governance positions of top executives. The 
emphasis here is on the positions that top executives have on boards, that is, whether 
they are executive (inside) directors (CEO, CFO), or non-executive (outside) 
directors. Agency theory addresses the potential conflicts of interests between 
executive and non-executive directors thus leading to discussions of how their views 
differ as a consequence of the different roles they occupy. Therefore, it is relevant to 
account for the (professional) roles that executives have in the boardroom as a 
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determinant of risk attitude. According to De Groot et al. (2012), if risk taking is an 
important principle of a company, and the board as a group decides on the risks to be 
taken, individual differences in the perceptions of executives in their willingness to 
take risks are essential determinants of boardroom dynamics.  
A company’s board serves various professional roles and tasks and these 
are distributed amongst members based on their expertise, functional background 
experience and risk propensity, amongst potentially other aspects. Agency theory 
states that an individual’s professional role in a company can influence decision 
making because of differences in outlook and operation of the different roles played 
within the board as well as differences in information levels (Gillete et al., 2008). 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) for example have a supervisory role in the board. 
As decision makers they may be more cautious than executive directors, where the 
potential presence of information asymmetry could be an explanation for this 
behavior.  
In addition, Jensen and Zajac (2004), aim to show in their study that top 
executives (executives and non-executive directors) who are demographically 
identical but occupy different roles are not necessarily related to the same strategic 
choices, neither are executives who are demographically different but occupy a 
similar role. Taken this all together generates the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
Executives for who the professional role and functional background experience 
match (are more consistent) are less risk averse and associate with more investment 
decisions than executives without this match.  
 
(Over-) confidence 
“Overconfidence is an important driver of individual choice behavior” (Griffin and 
Tversky, 1992) and “individuals who are overconfident put too much confidence in 
outcomes they believe are under their control” (March and Shapira, 1987). 
Particularly, top executives are presumed to possess such a personality characteristic 
(Hackbarth, 2008). According to de Groot et al. (2012) and Hackbarth (2008), (over-) 
confidence can influence decision taking and has an effect on risk taking. 
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Consequently, it is important to understand how this characteristic affects companies’ 
performance and therefore influences shareholder welfare. Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) recognize some traits of top executives that are related to company 
performance and emphasize the importance of (over-) confidence for companies’ 
investments.  
Goel and Thakor (2008) argue that top executives are expected to be 
overconfident because their success is based on past performance, which is in the 
end related to the risk they take. This suggests that overconfident executives are 
more willing to take risk. In addition, individuals that rank themselves higher with 
regard to their willingness to take risk, have a higher risk tolerance (Dohmen et al., 
2011). 
Ben-David et al. (2007) argue that investment projects are perceived with 
less risk by an overconfident manager, and also that such a manager assesses these 
projects with a low discount rate. Therefore, in comparison to a less confident 
manager, more projects will be perceived to have positive net present value. Hence, 
an overconfident manager will invest more. This leads us to postulate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 6: 
More confident executives are more willing to take risk and they also ignite more 
investments. 
 
Company characteristics 
Graham et al. (2013) document that there are various relationships between CEO 
characteristics and company characteristics. For example, male CEOs relative to 
female CEOs are more likely to have higher debt ratios and in particular higher 
short-term debt ratios. Subsequently, more debt generates more risk and higher 
expected returns, and this is a preference that might be related to executive personal 
characteristics. Some theories, like those outlined in Heaton (2002) and Hackbarth 
(2008) indicate that managers’ behavioral traits influence the use of debt in 
companies. Furthermore, Sung and Hanna (1996) identify various financial variables 
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such as debt which are related to risk tolerance and indicate that debt is positively 
related to risk tolerance. This brings us to our final hypothesis, which reads as 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
The larger is an executive’s risk tolerance, the more willing this executive is to use 
debt. 
 
In the next section we discuss the data collection, and in the subsequent section we 
present the empirical results for the above hypotheses. 
 
4.3 Data 
 
We collected data using a survey to analyze the risk attitudes of the board members 
of the companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. We used the survey 
proposed by De Groot et al. (2012) and adapted it to the Surinamese situation. De 
Groot et al. (2012) used a dynamic website to tailor the survey questions to 
individual responses, but we executed the survey as a structured interview in order to 
tailor the investment scenarios to the individual situations of the respondents. 
The survey was pre-tested on individuals with boardroom experience. Once 
their responses indicated that the questions were clear, we proceeded to send the 
survey to the respondents. 
 
Respondents 
The individuals in our survey work as board members for ten companies listed on 
the Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE). The survey was sent to both the executive and 
non-executive directors of these companies where their names were obtained from 
the companies’ annual reports. As Suriname is a small country in terms of 
population and companies, it became apparent that certain respondents were holding 
more than one executive post in more than one firm. The solution for this situation is 
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that these respondents had to complete the survey only once in the capacity of their 
main position. 
The survey, accompanied with an invitation letter, was first sent to the 
CEOs of the ten listed companies requesting their participation and also their 
approval to send the survey to the CFOs and the NEDs of the respective companies. 
In the letter is explicitly declared that the obtained information will be dealt with in 
confidence. The need to collect sufficient responses, created time between the 
survey/ interviews and the feedback. Nevertheless, we received a limited number of 
responses, that is, 13 full surveys. This is a small sample, but we should stress that 
the population is small too. Taking account of cross positions, 13 respondents 
amount to about 50% of the relevant board members of stock exchange listed firms 
in Suriname.  
 
Questions 
The purpose of our study is to identify a relation between various characteristics of 
top executives and their attitudes towards risk in the decision making process. 
Hence, we gather information on gender, age, functional experience and role within 
the company. In addition, we gain information on a number of company 
characteristics (company sector, number of employees and size of the company 
revenues). Subsequently, we ask the respondents to what extent in the last fifteen 
years they were involved in investment decisions and the typical size of these certain 
investments. With investments we mean new market expansion, expansion of 
production capacity, innovation or R&D projects, IT projects and acquisitions and 
mergers) they have decided on in the last fifteen years. 
 Our sample consists of 12 men and 1 woman. The minimum age is 42, 
maximum is 69 and the average age is 54 years. 9 of the 13 are a NED, while 4 are 
either CEO or CFO. The sectors that are represented in our sample are 2 in 
production, 3 in the hospitality sector (hotels and restaurants) and 8 in the financial 
sector (banking and investment). 2 of the interviewed board members are associated 
with a firm with an annual turnover of less than 50Mio SRD (Surinamese Dollar is 
about 0.3 USD), 3 are concerned with a turnover in between 50Mio and 100Mio 
SRD, and 8 of them deal with an annual turnover in between 101Mio and 500Mio 
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SRD. In our analysis below we will code these outcomes as 25, 75 and 300, which 
are the middle values of these three categories. The minimum number of employees 
is 57, the maximum is 431, while on average the firms have 272 employees.   
 When we analyze our data we will treat all our 13 respondents as 
executives. 
 
Table 4.1: Answers to the question: “How often were you involved 
in investment decisions in the past 15 years in each of the 
following areas?” 
 
 
Frequency (times) 
Area Never 1-5 5-10 10-15  > 15 
      Expansion to new markets 2 9 1 0 1 
Expansion of production capacity 1 9 1 0 1 
Innovation or R&D 2 7 2 0 1 
Information technology 4 6 1 1 0 
Mergers and acquisitions 5 8 0 0 0 
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Table 4.2: Answers to the question: “Which percentage of the 
annual turnover is usually spent of investments in each of the 
following areas?” 
 
 
Percentages 
     
Area 0-1% 2% 3% 4% 
5-
10% 
11-
20% 
Not 
relevant 
        Expansion to new markets 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 
Expansion of production 
capacity 
2 1 1 2 3 0 2 
Innovation or R&D 4 2 0 2 1 0 1 
Information technology 3 2 3 1 1 0 1 
Mergers and acquisitions 4 0 0 0 1 1 5 
 
Table 4.1 gives the responses to the question on investment decisions in the 
last 15 years, and it is clear there is quite some dispersion. The same holds for the 
results in Table 4.2 where we report on the question of which percentage of the 
annual turnover is usually spent on which decisions. Both tables tell us that even 
though the sample size is small, there is substantial variation in the data.  
 To measure risk attitude we ask the respondents to make an assessment of 
their willingness to take risk in general and in their professional role on an eleven 
point scale. According to Dohmen et al. (2009) this measure is used to examine 
heterogeneity and aspects of risk attitudes of the top executives. Using the same 
scale, the respondents are asked to rank the average CEO, CFO and non-executive 
director in their willingness to take risks. 
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Table 4.3: Judgment of own risk attitude (in our analysis coded by 
a number ranging from 1 to 10) 
 
Not willing at all 
    
Willing to a large extent Average 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
            "In general, are you willing to take risk or are you someone who 
prefers to avoid risk?" 
0 0 0 1 1 3 2 3 3 0 0 6.08 
            "Given your position in the firm, are you willing to take risk or are 
you someone who prefers to avoid risk?” 
0 0 0 2 2 2 1 5 1 0 0 5.62 
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Table 4.4: Judgment of own risk attitude of types of board 
members: “Do you think they are willing to take risk or are they 
someone who prefers to avoid risk?” (in our analysis coded by a 
number ranging from 1 to 10) 
 
 
Not willing at all 
    
Willing to a large extent Average 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
             CEO 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 3 1 1 0 5.77 
CFO 0 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 4.46 
NED 0 0 2 2 2 3 2 0 2 0 0 4.69 
 
Table 4.3 shows that there is substantial variation in the self-reported values on own 
risk attitude. Also, the average value of the judgment about the own risk attitude in 
general is slightly higher than that of the judgment given the position that one has 
within the firm.  
Table 4.4 gives the frequency of answers to three statements on the risk 
attitude of three types of board members. Clearly, a CEO is believed to be more 
willing to take risk than a CFO or NED, which corroborates with the results in De 
Groot et al. (2012), who could interview a much larger sample of individuals.  
 
Table 4.5: Four scenarios in words 
 
Scenario 1 
At a board meeting where the strategy of your firm has been discussed it became 
apparent that expansion is possible using a new marketing channel in another 
country. Your marketing and sales department estimates that the costs are x Mio 
SRD. If the plan fails, this investment is gone, but no other costs are to be expected. 
It is uncertain whether the new marketing channel really works, but the people at the 
relevant department estimate the success rate as y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky at all) 
to 7 (very risky), how do you estimate this risk of this investment? 
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Scenario 2 
Your firm considers an investment to increase production. The total amount is x Mio 
SRD. If it so turns out that the investment does not work and production does not 
increase, then the investment amount is lost but no other losses are incurred. The 
estimate that this project will be successful is y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky at all) to 
7 (very risky), how do you estimate this risk of this investment? 
 
Scenario 3 
The R&D department of your company recommends a new production technique. To 
see whether this technique works, some research has to be done. If the technique 
fails, the only costs were these research costs. Development costs are estimates as x 
Mio SRD, and the probability that the new technique is indeed applicable in your 
firm is y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky at all) to 7 (very risky), how do you estimate 
this risk of this investment? 
 
Scenario 4 
The IT department of your firm considers the implementation of a new system which 
in the longer term could lead to substantial savings. Costs of this implementation are 
estimated at x Mio SRD. If the new system does not meet its demands, then this 
investment amount is lost, but no other damage is done. The success rate of this 
project is estimated by the IT department as y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky at all) to 7 
(very risky), how do you estimate this risk of this investment? 
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Table 4.6: Four scenarios and four probabilities, the numbers 
 
Scenarios 
1 26000000 31000000 15000000 20000000 
2 20000000 26000000 31000000 15000000 
3 78727200 98409000 59045400 1.18E+08 
4 1.02E+08 76500000 1.28E+08 1.53E+08 
5 8000000 10000000 11000000 6000000 
6 59045400 1.18E+08 78727200 98409000 
7 63000000 52500000 31500000 42000000 
8 54000000 72000000 90000000 1.08E+08 
9 70000000 90000000 1.00E+08 50000000 
10 13200000 26400000 17600000 22000000 
11 98409000 78727200 1.18E+08 59045400 
12 20800000 15600000 26000000 31200000 
13 1.28E+08 1.53E+08 1.02E+08 76500000 
 
Probabilities (%) 
1 85 75 80 70 
2 75 85 90 80 
3 95 80 75 90 
4 80 90 70 95 
5 90 75 85 70 
6 70 80 90 80 
7 75 70 80 85 
8 80 75 90 70 
9 70 80 75 85 
10 75 85 90 70 
11 75 70 80 85 
12 90 70 85 75 
13 70 85 95 75 
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Answers to the questions on risk 
1 6 5 3 3 
2 7 6 5 5 
3 2 6 6 6 
4 - - - - 
5 - - - - 
6 4 3 6 6 
7 7 7 7 7 
8 5 4 5 5 
9 4 4 5 5 
10 - - - - 
11 - 3 3 3 
12 2 - - - 
13 6 6 6 6 
 
Finally, respondents are asked to assess four types of investment scenarios 
with different investment possibilities originating from the answers they have given 
to the question on their company’s annual revenues. Each respondent obtained four 
investment scenarios with two varying parameters, that is, the size of the initial 
investment that is lost in case of the investment fails, varying for each respondent 
between 30% to 60% of their specific company’s annual revenues, and the 
probability of success, which also varies for each respondent between 70% and 95% 
for each investment scenario. The scenarios are presented in Table 4.5 and the 
parameter setting as well as the answers are presented in Table 4.6. There are a few 
missing observations here, but still we can use some of the outcomes in our analysis, 
as we will indicate in the next section.  
 
4.4 Results 
 
This section contains the correlations and regression model outcomes for the data 
presented in the various tables. Of course, the sample size is small, as we have data 
on only 13 board members, but then still, we aim to falsify the hypotheses in Section 
2.  
 The first hypothesis H1 predicts that younger executives are more willing to 
take risk. To examine this hypothesis we regress the answers to the two questions in 
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Table 4.3 on a constant and the variable “age”. With White-corrected standard errors 
we get the parameter estimates -0.085 and t-statistic -1.903 (p value is 0.084) and -
0.095 with t-statistic -1.532 (p value is 0.154), respectively, both for 13 observations. 
So, there is some evidence that older executives are less willing to take risk, and 
hence we obtain moderate support for hypothesis 1.  
 The second hypothesis H2 predicts that the more experience companies’ 
executives have, the more willing they are to take risk. We base experience on the 
answers to the questions displayed in Table 4.1. We coded “Never” as 0, 1-5 is 
coded as 3, 5-10 is coded as 7.5, 10-15 is coded as 12.5 and more than 15 is coded as 
20. Next, we sum the answers to the 5 categories and call this variable “experience”. 
A regression of the answers to two questions in Table 4.1 on a constant and this 
“experience” variable gives an estimated parameter of -0.025 (White corrected t 
statistic -1.768 and p value 0.108) and -0.026 (t statistic -2.350 and p value 0.071). 
These results imply that more experience leads to a smaller willingness to take risk. 
Hence, hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
The third hypothesis H3 deals with the effect of output background. 2 of the 
13 respondents have such an output function. We now regress the two variables with 
the answers to the questions in Table 4.3 on a constant and a 1-0 dummy for the 
output function, and obtain t statistics equal to -1.382 and -0.107. A similar exercise 
is done for the answers to the questions in the third and first rows of Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. For the R&D investments questions we obtain a (white-corrected) t statistic of 
2.408 and 1.236, respectively. And for the question on market expansions we obtain 
t statistics with values -0.721 and 1.316. In sum, we do find support for the second 
item of Hypothesis 3, and can conclude that executives with output backgrounds are 
more likely to engage in R&D investments.  
The fourth hypothesis H4 posits that companies with more finance 
executives are more likely to engage in acquisition investment activities. 8 
respondents indicate to be active in the financial sector, and 5 in either industrial 
production or hotels/restaurants. We create a dummy variable “financial sector” 
which is 1 for the financial sector and 0 otherwise. The answers to the five questions 
in Table 4.2 are coded as “not relevant” is coded as 0, 0-1% as 0.5, 2%, 3%, 4% as 2, 
3, 4, 5-10% as 7.5 and 11-20 % as 15.5. A regression of the answers to the last 
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question in Table 4.1 on a constant and the financial sector dummy yields an 
estimated parameter 2.025 (with White corrected t statistic 2.905 and associated p 
value 0.014), whereas a regression of the answers to the last question in Table 4.2 
gives an estimate of 3.376 (t statistic 1.467 and p value 0.176). So, there indeed 
seems evidence that finance executives are more likely to engage in acquisition 
activities.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5) we predict that the more consistent an executive’s 
professional role and functional background experience are, the higher the risk 
tolerance, the more investment decisions. We define the consistency of the role and 
the functional experience as the sum of the answers to the questions in Table 4.1. 
The investment decisions are the answers to the questions in Table 4.2. Regressing 
the answers to each of the questions in Table 4.2 on the “consistency” variable, we 
get the estimates 0.041 (with White t statistic’s p value of 0.421), -0.004 (0.896), 
0.029 (0.212), 0.039 (0.001), and 0.012 (0.579), respectively. Hence, only in the case 
of investments in IT projects (the fourth question) we find that more consistency 
leads to more investment decisions. So, for IT projects we find support for this 
hypothesis, and for all other investments we do not find such support. 
 Hypothesis 6 (H6) states that more confident executives are more willing to 
take risk and they also ignite more investments. When we regress the answers to the 
questions in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 on a constant and the two answers to the questions in 
Table 4.3, we get nine insignificant regression models (with p values of the joint F 
test all much larger than 0.05) except for the case of R&D projects in Table 4.2. 
There the p value is 0.049. The key significant parameter associates with the second 
question in Table 4.3, and hence we can conclude that when board members indicate 
that they are willing to take risk given their position in the firm, that then the 
percentage that the firm invests in R&D is larger.  
 Finally, the seventh hypothesis H7 predicts that the higher an executive’s 
risk tolerance, the more willing he or she is to use debt. For each of the four 
scenarios, we create the following variables. The answers to the question on annual 
turnover are coded as 25Mio SRD for answer category 1, 75Mio SRD for category 2 
and 300 Mio SRD for category 3. Then we divide the size of the investment for each 
of the scenarios by these amounts. Next, we multiply the probability of success of 
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the project with this outcome, and finally we multiply this with the statement on the 
riskiness of the project, given the probability of success, and its size relative to the 
firm’s turnover. We take this new variable as a measure of a larger willingness to 
accept a risky project. Using a four-equation regression model where the 
“willingness” is on the left-hand side and the answers to the first question in Table 
4.3 is on the right-hand side, we obtain a pooled parameter estimate equal to 9.184 
with t statistic 1.698 and p value 0.099. For the second question in Table 4.3, using 
the same type of model, we obtain a parameter estimate equal to 6.107 with t statistic 
1.176 and p value 0.248. So, we seem have some mild evidence in support of H7.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the risk attitudes of board members of ten companies 
in a developing country. The sample of respondents is small, but this is also due the 
fact that the size of the population is small. As far as we know, this is the first ever 
study on such risk attitudes for a country with a developing economy. 
 Our hypotheses were all constructed from the literature on risk attitudes 
where the data were always collected for western industrialized countries. Most 
likely due to the small sample size we could not find much evidence for various 
hypotheses, but still various hypotheses did receive support.  
 To summarize, we find for this country with a developing economy and its 
firms that there is some evidence that younger executives are more willing to take 
risk and that executives with output backgrounds are more likely to engage in R&D 
investments. Also, we document that finance executives are more likely to engage in 
acquisition activities, and for IT projects that executives for who the professional 
role and functional background experience match are less risk averse and associate 
with more investment decisions than executives without this match. Finally, when 
executives indicate that they are willing to take risk, given their position in the firm, 
the percentage that the firm invests in R&D is also larger.  
 Naturally, the main limitation of this study is the sample size, but we 
believe that some interesting conclusions could be drawn. The main one seems to be 
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that the differences between risk attitudes of board members of companies in a 
country with a developing economy do not differ tremendously from those of board 
members in countries with developed economies. In addition, compared to 
developed economies, developing economies such as Suriname suffer from limited 
disclosure of information. 
 Much more future work can be done in this area. Some countries with 
developing economies are much larger than Suriname, and perhaps data collected for 
those countries can reveal more insights into the risk attitudes of board member of 
firms. 
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Chapter 5 
Risk attitudes in the boardroom and company 
performance: 
Evidence for an emerging economy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We personally interview thirteen board members of seven (out of the ten) companies 
listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange and ask questions about their past and current 
decisions and on their risk attitudes. Next, we correlate the answers to company 
performance in between 2003-2011, like earnings per share, stock returns, book 
value and market value. Recent literature on risk attitudes in the board, which 
usually draws on western economies, guides our formulation of hypotheses. At the 
same time we also perform some exploratory analyses. Our main result is that, for 
this emerging economy, more risk adversity leads to better firm performance. 
 
 
A first version of this chapter appeared as Bodeutsch, D., & Franses Ph.H.B.F. (2015), Risk attitudes in 
the boardroom and company performance: Evidence for an emerging economy (No. EI 2015-09). 
Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus School of Economics. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The performance of firms has been of great interest for scholars in various areas of 
business. When the members of the board of a company (the top executives like 
Chief Executive Officer, CEO and Chief Financial Officer, CFO) are regarded as a 
company’s essential human resources, several properties concerning their 
background and skills become important, as these may have a strong effect on firm 
performance. Such a hypothesized effect is in line with the upper echelons theory 
which states that top executives’ characteristics have an impact on organizational 
outcomes such as strategies and company performance (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). For example, the demographic characteristics of executives and various 
behavioral traits are often used as proxies for risk attitudes and these are then in turn 
used to describe corporate decisions, where these decisions are known to affect the 
company. Indeed, as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) also acknowledge in their study, it 
seems that current empirical studies usually rely on company-specific or industry-
specific characteristics to explain company performance, and that these studies 
neglect the potential role that individual executives may play in defining 
organizational outcomes. 
 Risk is an important element in financial decision-making. Graham et al. 
(2013) find that company policies are significantly related to the personality 
characteristics of executives, and these authors document that more risk-tolerant 
CEOs initiate more acquisitions. Malmendier and Tate (2005) analyze the relation 
between managerial overconfidence and corporate investment decisions and they 
show that overconfident CEOs, who are more willing to bear higher risks, take on 
more value-destroying mergers. Hamberg (2008) surveys top executives and reports 
that for these managers success is associated with low risk and high financial returns. 
This implies that perceiving risk in a certain way might influence many different 
financial decisions.  
The current literature on risk attitudes exclusively focuses on firms in 
western industrialized countries. In our study we will consider risk attitudes for 
board members in a country with an emerging economy.  
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In our present study we relate risk attitudes of board members of the 
companies listed on the Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE) with company 
performance. Suriname is a country in South America, with a population of about 
half a million inhabitants, and it is an emerging economy. Our main interest concerns 
the risk attitudes of Surinamese top executives who are responsible for (financial) 
decisions and how these attitudes correlate with company performance. Thus, rather 
than focusing on company-specific or industry-specific characteristics, we use 
personal characteristics of executives and we use direct questions as proxies for their 
risk attitudes to explain the relation with company performance. 
 We personally interview thirteen board members of seven (of the only ten) 
companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. We ask questions about their past 
and current decisions and on their risk attitudes. Explicitly connecting risk attitudes 
of CEOs and CFOs with actually observed company performance like stock returns 
has never been done before, and this is usually due to lack of data. Most surveys on 
risk performance in western countries rely on anonymous responses, but as we 
personally interviewed the thirteen executives, we can link personal information with 
their respective companies. Of course, we have access to only a small sample of 
data, which follows from the fact that we consider an emerging economy, but then 
still, this is the first study of its kind. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide 
the relevant theory and research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data collection 
and Section 4 summarizes the results of our analyses. Finally, in Section 5 we 
conclude with a discussion of the main findings. 
 
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Various characteristics of top executives are often used as proxies for their risk 
attitudes. These proxies are then used to explain the performance levels of the 
company to indicate how top executives affect the company. In our study we use 
(self-stated measures of) overconfidence, age and functional background experience 
as proxies for risk attitudes of thirteen Surinamese board members. Recent literature 
90 
 
on risk attitudes in the board, which usually draws on western economies, guides our 
formulation of hypotheses. As of yet, no such literature exists for emerging 
economies. 
 
Overconfidence and book to market equity ratio (BE/ME) 
Executives are often viewed as having their own methods when making corporate 
decisions such as investment, financing, and other strategic decisions, and as such 
their personal characteristics put a mark on the companies they control (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003). For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) find that 
overconfident CEOs have higher investment-cash flow sensitivities and are more 
likely to participate in value-destroying mergers. De Groot et al. (2012) show that 
overconfident board members demand a lower expected return and sense less risk of 
a given investment, and therefore are more willing to take risk. In Ben-David et al. 
(2010), it is documented that companies with overconfident executives seem to 
pursue more investments and more debt financing. In addition, Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) indicate that in companies with low BE/ME ratios (which are usually growth 
companies), executives are more likely to overestimate their own abilities to manage 
acquisitions, that is, their hubris leads to overconfidence (see also Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008 and Roll, 1986). As growth companies are companies with high stock 
returns in the past and high past growth in earnings and cash flow, this presumably 
strengthens the executives’ own actions to initiate acquisitions.  
 Malmendier and Tate (2008) also argue that overconfidence is related to the 
executives’ views that their company is undervalued by outside investors who seem 
less optimistic about the company’s outlook. Furthermore, to the extent that 
executives are more willing to endeavor in risky projects but with greater value, 
acquisition returns among high BE/ME companies may be larger (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998), and as such increase company performance. Companies with high 
BE/ME ratios are usually classified as companies with low stock prices, poor 
earnings and relatively few growth investment opportunities. Taking all together, 
and based on the available literature, we thus put forward the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
91 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: 
Overconfident executives are more likely to work in growth companies with low 
BE/ME ratios. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: 
Overconfident executives in value companies with high BE/ME ratios are more likely 
to pursue more new investments. 
 
Executive demographic characteristics versus book to market 
equity ratio (BE/ME), market capitalization (ME) and stock 
returns 
According to Graham et al. (2013), young and confident executives who do not have 
financial or accounting backgrounds are more likely to work for growth companies. 
In addition, risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to work in companies which 
performed good in the past (high historical growth) and also with high expected 
growth. Barry et al. (2002) and Fama and French (1995, 1998), among others, 
classify growth companies as companies with persistently high earnings and with 
low BE/ME ratios. On the other hand, high BE/ME companies, commonly known as 
value firms, may have been poor performers in the past (Cain and McKeon, 2014). 
Cain and McKeon (2014) also state that in companies with high BE/ME 
ratios (value companies), top executives and large stakeholders will be more prudent 
before accepting a major transaction which may well affect the survival of the 
company. BE/ME apparently is an accounting variable that plays a significant role in 
explaining the behavior of stock returns and acts as a measure for past performance. 
Bodeutsch and Franses (2014) report related evidence for companies listed at the 
Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE), and in that sense the listed firms have similar 
properties as firms in western countries. 
In addition, Graham et al. (2013) argue that company size can be important 
for a variety of reasons. A larger size can suggest a certain amount of solidity and it 
has consequences for growth. In the modern finance literature, the company size has 
been measured typically in terms of market capitalization, ME, that is, the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by a stock’s closing price. In our study company size 
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is defined as market capitalization which is the market approximate of a company’s 
value (see also Bodeutsch and Franses, 2014). 
Furthermore, much research has evolved in identifying company 
characteristics such as ME, BE/ME which explain differences in common stock 
returns. Fama and French (1998) indicate that stocks of small companies (low ME) 
have higher average returns than stocks of large companies (high ME). This is 
usually called the size effect. And, companies with high BE/ME ratios have higher 
average returns than companies with low BE/ME ratios. This is known as the value 
effect. Cain and McKeon (2014) argue that among high BE/ME companies, risk 
taking CEOs are associated with significantly higher announcement returns. One 
possible explanation for this pattern is that among value companies with relatively 
few growth opportunities, risk taking CEOs identify and select projects with 
valuable new growth prospects.  
 
Age 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) indicate that some studies show consistent results with 
regard to the correlation between the age of top executives and company 
characteristics. Young executives are usually related to company growth. In these 
studies it is also identified that volatility of earnings and sales is linked to young 
executives reflecting that in particular youthful executives take risks (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). In contrast to younger executives, older executives are more 
conservative and shall be more concerned about career and financial security, and 
thus avoid riskier projects. Taking the above together, we put forward the following 
two hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: 
Younger executives are more likely to work for growth companies with low BE/ME 
ratios, whereas older executives are more likely to work for value companies with 
high BE/ME ratios. 
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Hypothesis 2.2:  
Younger executives working in value companies with high BE/ME ratios are more 
willing to take risk and thus create higher stock returns. 
 
Functional background experience 
According to Jensen and Zajac (2004), functional background experience has 
extensively been referred to as the demographic characteristic to influence company 
performance. Hambrick and Mason (1984) classify functional backgrounds into 
output and throughput backgrounds. Output backgrounds concern marketing and 
sales positions, entrepreneurship and product R&D emphasize growth (see Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984), and these output backgrounds tend to show a positive relation 
with firm performance measures (Norburn and Birley, 1988). Furthermore, Norburn 
and Birley (1988) add that throughput backgrounds, which are associated with 
production, accounting and finance and process R&D, demonstrate a relation with 
larger companies, but are negatively related with firm performance measures. Thus, 
we stipulate: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1:  
Executives with output backgrounds are more likely to work for growth companies 
with low BE/ME ratios. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2:  
Executives with throughput backgrounds are more likely to work for companies with 
high ME. 
 
Finally, when we combine the arguments with regard to age and functional 
background experience, we arrive at the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
Young executives with output backgrounds are more likely to work for growth 
companies with low BE/ME ratios. 
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Below we will examine these hypotheses for a sample of surveyed board members 
for the emerging economy of Suriname.  
 
5.3 Data 
 
We personally interviewed thirteen board members of seven (of the ten) companies 
listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange and ask questions about their past and current 
decisions and on their risk attitudes. We executed the interviews in the period March 
– April 2014. We also succeeded to arrange face to face interviews with some of the 
top executives of Suriname. The questions for the interview are derived from the 
survey proposed by De Groot et al. (2012). We ask the respondents to make an 
assessment on an eleven-point scale of how they perceive themselves in general and 
in their professional role with regard to their willingness to take risk.  
 The two questions about risk are  
 
R1: Are you, in general, someone who is willing to take risk? 
 
where an answer can be given on a scale of 0 (totally not willing) to 10 (very 
willing), and  
 
R2:  Are you, in your position in your company, someone who is willing to take 
risk? 
 
where again an answer can be given on a scale of 0 (totally not willing) to 10 (very 
willing).  
 
Furthermore, we ask the respondents to indicate how often they were 
involved, in the last 15 years, in investment decisions in five categories. The answer 
categories varied from 0, 1-5 times, 5-10 times, 10-15 times, and more than 15 
times, in the last 15 years. The categories are 
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I1: Expansion to new markets 
I2:  Extension of production capacity 
I3:  Innovation or R&D processes 
I4:  IT projects 
I5: Mergers and acquisitions 
 
We also asked the respondents to point out which percentage of the annual 
turnover of their company is usually used for investments in one of the same five 
categories. The answer options are 0-1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-
40%, 41-50%, more than 50%, or not applicable. We code these answers by taking 
the middle values of each of the answer options, and label them as  
 
C1: Expansion to new markets 
C2:  Extension of production capacity 
C3:  Innovation or R&D processes 
C4:  IT projects 
C5: Mergers and acquisitions 
 
At the end of the interview the respondents are asked about their functional 
background and their age. Two of the interviewees have an output functional 
background. The other nine have a throughput background.  
To measure firm performance we have access to data since 2003 until and including 
2011 on Stock returns, Market value (ME), Book value (BE) and Earnings per share 
(see Bodeutsch and Franses, 2014). We employ the firm-specific factors BE/ME and 
ME for the hypotheses in the previous section. BE/ME is an accounting variable and 
acts as a measure for past performance, whereas company size is defined as market 
capitalization. In addition, we use the data in levels (like Market value in 2003, 
Market value in 2011, Average Market Value across 2003-2011) and also in growth 
rates (like percentage difference in Book value in 2011 relative to 2003). The board 
members who we interviewed have been affiliated with their companies for a long 
time, and hence we can study changes in firm performance and their link with board 
members’ characteristics. 
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5.4 Results 
 
Before we look at the estimation results that are associated with the hypotheses, we 
first check whether the answers to the various questions are related in order to see if 
there is any face validity of the survey results. For that purpose we run regressions in 
which we regress the growth in Market Value, the growth in Book value, the growth 
in Earnings per Share and the Stock Returns, all for 2011 relative to 2003, on the 
answers in questions I1 to I5. Indeed, one would hope to see that investments in the 
five categories did indeed benefit the firms’ performance.  
 The estimation results are reported in Table 5.1. We see that 19 out of 20 
parameter estimates have the expected positive sign. We also see that 13 of the 20 
estimates are significantly different from 0, at the 10% level. From the table we can 
read which investments in the last 15 years (I1 to I5) have helped growth in four 
dimensions. The variables I1-I4 have positive effect on Market Value growth, I5 
mainly on Book value growth, I1, I2 and I4 on growth in Earnings per share, and I1-
I4 for positive stock returns. Hence, even though the sample size is small, the 
respondents’ answers do match with actually observed firm performance.  
 It could have been the case that the answers to I1 through I5 concern an 
endogenous variable, as the board members of course are aware of their own firm 
performance. We therefore examined and tested for endogeneity, where we used the 
answers to C1 through C5 as the instruments. Of course, the sample size is small, 
and hence the power of tests for endogenous regressors is small. We found in only 
one case some mild evidence of an endogenous regressor, and in all other cases the p 
values were very far away from 10%. So, we are tempted to conclude that the 
regression results in Table 5.1 can interpreted as that the thirteen board members 
consciously responded to our survey questions.  
 We now turn to the hypotheses. Due to scarcity of our data, our regression 
models cannot contain more than two variables. All models contain an intercept but 
we do not report estimation results for the intercept, only for the variables that are 
included. Next, we will always report p values based on White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
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Hypothesis 1.1 predicts that overconfident executives are more likely to 
work in growth companies with low BE/ME ratios. A regression of Average BE/ME 
(averaged over the years 2003 to 2011) on a constant and answers to R1, the 
estimated parameter is 0.129 with a p value 0.502. A regression of BE/ME of just 
2011 on a constant and answers to R1, we get a parameter 0.047 and a p value 0.764, 
while for BE/ME of 2003 we get the estimate 0.212 and associated p value 0.916. 
When we run the same three regressions, now with the answers to R2 as the 
independent variable, we obtained the parameter estimates 0.314 with p value 0.046, 
0.208 with p value 0.118 and 0.420 with p value 0.028, respectively.  
In sum, as hypothesis H1.1 has predicted negative-valued parameter 
estimates, but we generally find evidence against this hypothesis. Hence, when the 
board members think about their risk attitude in their professional role then we see 
that confident executives are more likely to work in growth companies with high 
BE/ME ratios. 
One potential explanation of this finding can be that our companies 
considered all are in business for quite some time, and new entries are rare in this 
emerging economy.  
 
Hypothesis H1.2 states that overconfident executives in value companies 
with high BE/ME ratios are more likely to pursue more new investments. To 
examine this hypothesis, we regress the scores on I1 to I5 and C1 to C5 on the 
answers to R1 (or R2), where we now include two variables. These variables are the 
answers to R1 and the answers to R1 when multiplied with Average BE/ME.  
The results for I1 to I5 are as follows (and details can be obtained from the 
authors). There are no significant findings for I1 to I4 and R1 and the interactive 
term. However, a regression of I5 on R1 and R1 times Average BE/ME gives a 
parameter estimate -0.412 with p value of 0.110 and an estimate 0.082 with p value 
0.018, respectively. So, we do find support for Hypothesis 1.2 only for Mergers and 
Acquisitions.  
 When we turn from the individual to the company, and thus look at the 
answers to C1 to C5, and the regressions on R1 and R1 times Average BE/ME, we 
get significant parameters for the interaction terms for C2 and C4, where these 
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estimated parameters are -0.156 (p value 0.074) and -0.112 (p value 0.040), 
respectively. Here we thus find significant evidence against Hypothesis 1.2 for 
extension of production facilities and IT projects. 
 Turning to the answers for the second self-stated risk variable R2, with also 
the interaction term, we again find support for Hypothesis 1.2 for Mergers and 
Acquisitions as the estimated parameters are -0.710 with p value 0.010 (for R2) and 
0.131 with p value 0.006 for the interaction term. Additionally, for C2, C3, and C4 
the interaction term parameters are -0.288 with p value 0.003, -0.154 with p value 
0.061 and -0.197 with p value 0.023, respectively. So, here there is strong support 
against Hypothesis H1.2. 
 In sum, in contrast to the findings for western industrialized countries, we 
find for our data on an emerging economy some counter evidence for the hypothesis 
that overconfident executives in value companies with high BE/ME ratios are more 
likely to pursue more new investments.  
Hypothesis H2.1 states that younger executives are more likely to work for 
growth companies with low BE/ME ratios, and thus that older executives are more 
likely to work for value companies with high BE/ME ratios. When we regress 
Average BE/ME, BE/ME of 2003 and BE/ME of 2011 on Age, then for none of the 
three regressions we obtain significant parameters. So, there is no support for H2.1.   
Hypothesis H2.2 says that younger executives working in value companies 
with high BE/ME ratios are more willing to take risk and thus create higher stock 
returns. When we run the same regressions but now including Age and Age times 
R1, then neither of these has significant parameters. In contrast, when we regress 
Average BE/ME, BE/ME of 2003 and BE/ME of 2011 on Age and Age times the 
second risk variable R2, we get all significant parameters for the interaction term and 
these are 0.009 with p value 0.003, 0.011 with p value of 0.004 and 0.006 with p 
value 0.003, respectively. Hence we find, in contrast to Hypothesis H2.2, that older 
board members, who are also more risk taking in their professional role, work for 
value companies with high BE/ME ratios. So, again we find significant evidence 
against the hypotheses.  
To examine Hypothesis H3.1, we regress Average BE/ME (averaged over 
the years 2003 to 2011), BE/ME in 2003 and BE/ME in 2011 on an intercept and a 
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dummy for Output function (only 2 of the 13 interviewees). We do not find any 
significant parameters. Similarly, to examine Hypothesis 3.2, we regress Average 
ME, ME in 2003 and ME in 2011 on an intercept and a dummy for Throughput 
function (11 of the 13 interviewees), but again we find no significant parameters. 
Finally, to examine Hypothesis H4, we regress Average BE/ME, BE/ME in 
2003 and BE/ME in 2011 on an intercept, Age and Age times a dummy for Output 
function (only 2 of the 13 interviewees), and again we find no significant parameters. 
 So far, we tested the various hypotheses, and basically we find either no 
supporting evidence or we find strong evidence against the hypotheses.  
 Finally, we consider potential correlations between the actually observed 
growth rates in the four firm performance measures and the answers on the self-
stated risk questions. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.2. The bottom 
row of that table shows that R2 is most often significant and always obtains a 
negative estimated parameter. This means that a higher risk attitude in their 
professional role leads to negative growth in all four dimensions. So, here, for this 
emerging economy, more risk adversity apparently leads to better performance. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the relation between risk attitudes of thirteen board 
members of seven (of the ten) companies and company performance in an emerging 
economy Suriname. Even though the sample of respondents is small, this is the first 
ever study on such risk attitudes of board members for an emerging economy. 
 Our hypotheses were all designed from the literature on risk attitudes and 
company performance where the data have always been collected for western 
economies. Most likely due to the small sample size we could not find much 
evidence for various hypotheses, but still we find some significant evidence, and 
then usually in contrast to the postulated hypotheses. 
 To summarize, we find for this emerging economy substantial evidence that 
when board members think about their risk attitude in their professional role that 
over-(confident) executives are more likely to work for growth companies with high 
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BE/ME ratios, which is significant evidence in contrast to the posited hypothesis that 
overconfident executives are more likely to work in growth companies with low 
BE/ME ratios. With regard to the hypothesis that overconfident executives in value 
companies with high BE/ME ratios are more likely to pursue more new investments, 
we only find contrasting evidence for mergers and acquisitions. We also find the 
same support if we turn to the executives’ professional role. When we turn to the 
individual we find significant support against the relevant hypothesis for the 
extension of product capacity and IT projects. Finally, we find that younger 
executives are more likely to work for value companies with high BE/ME ratios, and 
that older board members who are also risk taking in their professional role work for 
value companies with high BE/ME ratios. 
 Most interestingly, we find for this emerging economy of Suriname, that 
more risk adversity by board members apparently leads to better firm performance. 
 We now provide a speculative discussion on why results for an emerging 
economy could be different from those of western economies. Perhaps the impact of 
cultural differences is important. Culture would be expected to affect the way firms 
are formed and financed and the way people engage in doing business (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2011). For example, Graham, et al. (2013) find evidence that US and non-
US firms differ because of the differences in executives’ characteristics and risk 
attitudes. According to Allen (2005), this can possibly be explained by firms outside 
the US having different norms. 
Suriname as an emerging economy ranks on the 162
nd
 place (out of the 189 
places) with regard to the ease of doing business (World Bank, 2015). This is in 
contrast to western economies such as the US who ranks on the 7
th
 place and the 
Netherlands on the 27
th
 place. A low ranking on the ease of doing business index 
means that the regulatory environment does not contribute sufficiently to set up and 
operate a local company (World Bank, 2015). The outdated legislation in Suriname 
is not conducive to investments (Ministry of Labor, Technological Development and 
Environment, 2013). Although the government has made some efforts to ease the 
procedures of starting a business in 2012-2013, they did not achieve this goal 
completely. For example, an entrepreneur in New Zealand must pass one procedure 
and waits half a day to start a business whereas an entrepreneur in Suriname must 
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pass thirteen procedures and now waits 84 days (World Bank, 2015). Following 
these arguments, it can be concluded that the business environment in Suriname is 
not as developed to attract entrepreneurship which can result in people preferring to 
work and stay in safer jobs, thus ultimately are less willing to take risk. Hence, it 
seems to some extent imbedded in current Suriname’s culture to choose for certainty 
when doing business. Whether our findings for this developing economy extend to 
other emerging economies is something to be considered in further research.  
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Table 5.1: Estimation results of a regression of the growth in firm 
performance measures (2011 relative to 2003) on an intercept and 
the answer to the questions on investment decisions in the last 15 
years in the categories I1: Expansion to new markets, I2: 
Extension of product capacity, I3: Innovation or R&D processes, 
I4: IT projects and I5: Mergers and acquisitions. The table 
reports the parameter estimates and the associated White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent p values. The sample size is 13. In 
bold are the parameter estimates that are significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
Growth in 
 
Market value Book value EPS Stock price 
Question 
    I1 46.48 (0.002) 9.826 (0.252) 55.03 (0.019) 72.73 (0.002) 
I2 47.72 (0.002) 8.239 (0.409) 57.62 (0.011) 74.30 (0.001) 
I3 39.08 (0.002) 11.01 (0.099) -62.64 (0.738) 65.38 (0.002) 
I4 56.18 (0.040) 21.44 (0.184) 66.17 (0.053) 85.20 (0.050) 
I5 126.8 (0.162) 106.3 (0.013) 181.5 (0.138) 200.8 (0.153) 
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Table 5.2: Estimation results for the regression of the observed 
growth rates in Market Value, Book Value, earnings per share 
and Stock Price, on the answers to the risk questions R1 and R2. 
The table reports the parameter estimates and the associated 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent p values. The sample size is 
13. In bold are the parameter estimates that are significant at the 
10% level. 
 
Growth in 
 
Market value Book value EPS Stock price 
Question 
    R1 21.58 (0.809) -55.20 (0.186) -60.10 (0.548) -7.512 (0.957) 
R2 -103.9 (0.240) -93.24 (0.003) -207.4 (0.035) -183.8 (0.151) 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we provide a summary of the main findings of the four empirical 
studies, the limitations and we point out various policy recommendations. 
 Our research provides an impression of an emerging financial market. The 
research is executed in Suriname which has an emerging economy. Given the 
emphasis being placed that stock markets in emerging economies are often viewed 
as a source of financial development and that a well-functioning stock market can 
ultimately lead to economic growth, it is of interest to examine the Suriname Stock 
Exchange (SSE). 
In Chapter 2 we studied the stock exchange of Suriname and we provided 
the first ever quantitative analysis of the stock returns of ten companies listed at the 
SSE. We documented that average returns over the years 2003 to and including 2011 
are not high, and that inflation-corrected returns are often negative, at least on 
average across these years. We showed that stock returns patterns across the ten 
stocks have similar behavior in various dimensions, and that estimates of conditional 
volatility parameters for the index bear similarities with index returns in developed 
countries. One partial conclusion of our study is thus that the SSE index shows some 
signs of weak-form efficiency. However, the way the prices are set indicates some 
level of illiquidity in the market. Further, there are no designated market traders, and 
trades occur on average only twice a month with low volumes of such trades. Even 
though the SSE is operationally inefficient, the time series properties of the index 
mimic those that are usually found in other stock markets. In sum, we must conclude 
that there still is much more efficiency to be gained for the SSE. 
In Chapter 3 we discussed the size and value effects of Suriname. We 
considered the ten foremost important companies in Suriname, their performance on 
the Suriname Stock Exchange and the link between that performance and 
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fundamentals. Using the approach of Fama and French (1992), we have found that 
there is apparently no size effect, but there is a value effect. Book-to-market equity 
(BE/ME), which is the ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value 
has the expected positive effect on stock returns. Companies with a high BE/ME 
ratio (known as value firms) are related to poor performance in the past (low stock 
prices, poor earnings, and distress). So, also in Suriname, value firms have high 
stock returns which can be seen as an important factor for the Surinamese market 
and ultimately the investor. We could not find any significant size effects in 
Suriname, but this may also be due to the small sample. The sign of the size effects 
is different than usually encountered (as it is positive), and this corroborates well 
with the findings in related studies on emerging markets. 
The implications of our study are the following. Until now, the Suriname 
Stock Exchange has not been fully considered as a source of capital. However, 
Suriname can benefit from the evidence of our study for the following reasons. Fama 
and French (1992) and others report that size and book-to-market equity are 
considered as variables which can provide information from stock prices about risk 
and expected returns. Value and growth are two fundamentals for stock selection and 
these reported variables can thus be useful. Value firms are perceived as underpriced 
firms (cheap stocks) and not appreciated by the market. If the Surinamese market 
realizes that the prospects of value firms are not as weak as proposed by the 
developments in the recent past, the stock price will increase and this in turn could 
result in investors gaining an interest in those firms. Value investors have been 
rewarded with a large risk premium. In addition, value firms not listed on the SSE, 
seeking capital to finance their growth, can be motivated to be listed on the SSE. 
According to the indicators size (measured by the number of companies listed and 
the MCAP/GDP ratio) and liquidity (measured by turnover/GDP and turnover ratio), 
the SSE has not grown remarkably in the past years (see Bodeutsch and Franses, 
2014). As a result, these value firms can ensure that the number of firms listed on the 
SSE increases.  
The listed companies on the SSE may contribute in the process of economic 
growth. This increases an interest to understand more about the executives of these 
firms. Thus, we need to consider the companies’ top executives in Suriname who are 
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responsible for the financial and strategic decisions. In Chapter 4, we analyzed the 
risk attitudes of board members of seven (of the ten) companies listed on the SSE. 
The sample of respondents is small, but this is of course  due to the fact that the size 
of the population is small. As far as we know, this is the first ever study on such risk 
attitudes for a country with a developing economy. Our hypotheses were all 
constructed from the literature on risk attitudes where the data were always collected 
for western industrialized countries. Most likely due to the small sample size we 
could not find much evidence for various hypotheses, but still various hypotheses 
did receive support.  
To summarize, we find that there is some evidence that younger executives 
are more willing to take more risk and that executives with output backgrounds are 
more likely to engage in R&D investments. Also, we document that finance 
executives are more likely to engage in acquisition activities. Furthermore, for IT 
projects we find that executives for who the professional role and functional 
background experience match are less risk averse and associate with more 
investment decisions than executives without this match. Finally, when executives 
indicate that they are willing to take risk, given their position in the firm, the 
percentage that the firm invests in R&D is also larger.  
Naturally, the main limitation of this study is the sample size, but we 
believe that some interesting conclusions could be drawn. The main one seems to be 
that the differences between risk attitudes of board members of companies in a 
developing economy do not differ tremendously from those of board members in 
developed economies. In addition, compared to  countries with developed 
economies, developing financial markets such as that of Suriname suffer from 
limited disclosure of information. 
Much more future work can be done in this area. Some countries with 
developed economies are much larger than Suriname, and perhaps data collected for 
those countries can reveal more insights into the risk attitudes of board member of 
firms.  
 In Chapter 5, we studied the relation between risk attitudes of thirteen board 
members of the seven companies examined in chapter 4 and company performance. 
Even though the sample of respondents is small, this is the first ever study on such 
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risk attitudes of board members for an emerging economy. Most likely due to the 
small sample size we could not find much evidence for various hypotheses, but still 
we find some significant evidence, and then usually in contrast to the postulated 
hypotheses. 
To summarize, we find for the emerging economy of Suriname substantial 
evidence that when board members think about their risk attitude in their 
professional role that over-(confident) executives are more likely to work for growth 
companies with high BE/ME ratios, which is significant evidence in contrast to the 
posited hypothesis that overconfident executives are more likely to work in growth 
companies with low BE/ME ratios. With regard to the hypothesis that overconfident 
executives in value companies with high BE/ME ratios are more likely to pursue 
more new investments, we only find contrasting evidence for mergers and 
acquisitions. We also find the same support if we turn to the executives’ professional 
role. When we turn to the individuals we find significant support against the usually 
maintained hypothesis for the extension of product capacity and IT projects. Finally, 
we find that younger executives are more likely to work for value companies with 
high BE/ME ratios, and that older board members who are also risk taking in their 
professional role work for value companies with high BE/ME ratios. 
Most interestingly, we find for this emerging economy of Suriname, that 
more risk adversity by board members apparently leads to better firm performance. 
 
6.2 Limitations 
 
Empirical information with regard to this subject in Suriname is scarce due to the 
unavailability of information. In our studies we managed to collect unique data 
through various possibilities of data collection. Data on the SSE had to be collected 
by hand, and it took much effort to collect the relevant annual reports of various 
firms. Also, the sample size is small, as the population is small. Until now, there are 
eleven companies listed on the SSE of which for ten of these we could obtain 
consecutive time series data since 2003. In addition, we succeeded in interviewing 
thirteen board members of these companies. Consequently, it is difficult to 
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generalize. Our studies can form a basis for future research executed in other 
developing economies which in turn can contribute to the development of general 
theories. 
 In fact, at various occasions in our studies we found significant results but 
with outcomes in contrast to the commonly reported findings in the literature. Most 
of the literature deals with developed economies in western countries. It may well 
that situations in developing economies are very different, perhaps due to differing 
investment perceptions or differing attitudes towards entrepreneurship, and that new 
theories have to be developed for emerging economies.  
 
6.3 Policy recommendations 
 
The SSE reveals some of the classical limitations of small emerging markets 
(illiquidity, thin trading, and inefficiency), signaling a rather underdeveloped stock 
market. For example, the returns data sometimes show some odd changes.  
Suriname as an emerging economy shares common features with other 
emerging markets. In particular, with respect to their history and the development of 
their financial sector where security markets are relatively of less importance. In 
order to understand the behavior and the development of emerging economies, we 
provide a brief discussion of countries with a comparable start as Suriname. 
Suriname (independent in 1975) and Guyana (independent in 1966), two 
neighboring countries on the northeast coast of South America, have both 
experienced economic decline after their independence. Cameroon in Africa, became 
independent in 1960 and was confronted with a severe decline in economic 
performance in the early 1980s. So, it may take a while after independence for a new 
economy to become mature. In addition, Suriname and Guyana both have an 
ethnically heterogeneous population, having similar ethnic characteristics except for 
the presence in Suriname of sizable minorities of Indonesians and Maroons (Singh, 
2008). Cameroon also consists of a great diversity of people and ethnic groups. 
According to Easterly and Levine (1997), ethnic diversity is correlated with slow 
economic growth. 
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With regard to the economic development of these countries over the past 
years, Suriname’s GDP per capita has grown from US$ 2,610 in 2003 to US$ 8,864 
(updated: US$ 9,378) in 2012. Guyana’s GDP per capita has grown from US$ 984 in 
2003 to US$ 3,548 in 2012 while Cameroon’s GDP per capita has grown from US$ 
790 in 2003 to US$ 1,219 in 2012 (World Bank, 2015). 
Suriname has established a stock exchange in 1994, the Suriname Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and Guyana has established one in 2003, the Guyana Stock 
Exchange (GSE). Cameroon has no stock exchange as of yet. Until now the SSE has 
not effectively contributed to economic development in Suriname. The impact of the 
GSE on Guyana’s economy is unknown. The number of companies listed on the 
GSE increased from twelve (June 2003) to fifteen (December, 2011). 
http://www.gasci.com/results/current.htm. According to Gooptu (1994), a small 
number of participants signals inefficient market making. These countries’ financial 
systems are largely dominated by the banking sector. 
Moreover, Suriname, Guyana and Cameroon have in common a relatively 
poor business climate. According to the Doing Business Index of the World Bank 
(2015), Suriname ranks on the 162
nd
 place, Guyana on the 123
rd
 and Cameroon on 
the 158
th
 place out of the 189 places. 
In summary, emerging economies have certain aspects in common which 
may hamper financial development and economic growth. 
 
We now provide some policy recommendations for policy makers and 
regulators in Suriname. One of the pillars of a country’s welfare is a well-developed 
financial sector. The primary role of financial institutions and capital markets is to 
allocate capital efficiently to the most profitable investments. In the case of 
Suriname it is important that more financing possibilities are created for start-up 
companies and for the continuing operations of existing companies. As stated by the 
Suriname Trade and Industry Association (STIA), “the private sector is the driver of 
economic growth”. With this, it is important to consider the Suriname Stock 
Exchange as another source of capital to finance companies’ investments. In order to 
stimulate the development of the SSE, regulators could try to attain weak form 
efficiency of the SSE by taking steps to increase the number of market participants 
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by encouraging the listing of companies. As stated by Bodeutsch and Franses (2014), 
the Surinamese government should facilitate better stock market performance 
through for example improved disclosure requirements and settlement procedures. 
Suriname has issued the capital market law (Wet Kapitaalmarkt) in 2014. It 
states that internationally capital markets need to comply with the principles released 
by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The 
principles include investor protection, ensuring fair, efficient, transparent and 
regulated markets. These conditions form the basis for the development of a well-
functioning capital market. In the future, enforcement of the law needs to be 
considered. 
In addition, according to Yartey (2008), the establishment of good quality 
institutions can influence the attractiveness of equity investment and lead to stock 
market development. Well-developed institutions minimize political risk, an 
important factor in investment decisions.  
Suriname consistently received a low ranking on the ease of doing business 
index over the past years which means that the regulatory environment does not 
contribute sufficiently to set up and operate a local company (World Bank, 2015). 
The outdated legislation in Suriname is not conducive to investments (Ministry of 
Labor, Technological Development and Environment, 2013). 
For policy makers and regulators is it essential to create a business 
environment where entrepreneurship is stimulated. Some efforts have also been 
made. For instance, in September 2011, Suriname signed on to become the 183
rd
 
member of the International Financing Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank. 
Through this membership the government hopes to obtain access to cheaper, long 
term financing for the private sector and support in identifying and developing new 
investment possibilities (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2013). 
In sum, a properly functioning stock market may contribute in improving 
the business climate and ultimately enhance economic growth. 
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
Aandelenmarkten in opkomende economieën worden vaak gezien als een bron van 
financiële ontwikkeling en uiteindelijk ook als een bron van economische groei. 
Goed functionerende of efficiënte aandelenmarkten kunnen bijdragen aan de 
ontwikkeling van de financiële sector van een land door een toename van 
besparingen, efficiënte allocatie van kapitaal naar de meest rendabele investeringen 
en beter gebruik van bestaande financiële middelen. De efficiëntie van 
aandelenmarkten is vooral belangrijk voor landen met opkomende economieën 
gezien deze landen ernaar streven om de wereldwijde economische groei bij te 
houden. Om te kunnen profiteren van financiering door de uitgifte van aandelen is 
het voor landen met opkomende economieën van belang dat hun aandelenmarkten 
ten minste het laagste niveau van marktefficiëntie bezitten namelijk de zwakke vorm 
van efficiëntie. Dit betekent dat alle informatie over historische prijzen en 
handelsvolumes in de huidige marktprijs van het aandeel is verwerkt. 
Opkomende economieën delen gemeenschappelijke kenmerken in het 
bijzonder met betrekking tot hun financiële sector, waar het bankwezen domineert, 
terwijl de aandelenmarkten relatief minder belangrijk zijn voor het aantrekken van 
financiering (indirecte versus directe financiering). Echter, door het verstrekken van 
alternatieve middelen voor de financiering van investeringen, kunnen 
aandelenmarkten de effecten van de dominerende rol van banken reduceren. In 
Suriname is het bankwezen van oudsher ook de belangrijkste speler in de financiële 
sector. De aandelenmarkt in Suriname kan in deze optreden als een alternatieve bron 
van financiering. 
Gezien de rol die de aandelenmarkt in Suriname kan spelen, onderzoeken 
wij in dit proefschrift de Surinaamse effectenbeurs als onderdeel van de financiële 
markt van Suriname. Suriname heeft sinds 1994 een aandelenmarkt, de Surinaamse 
effectenbeurs. Wij bestuderen de empirische eigenschappen inclusief de zwakke 
vorm van efficiëntie van de aandelenrendementen van tien bedrijven die genoteerd 
zijn op de effectenbeurs. Wij onderzoeken ook de prestatie van de aandelen van deze 
tien bedrijven op de beurs en de relatie tussen de prestatie van deze bedrijven en 
bepaalde factoren. We zijn erin geslaagd om unieke gegevens te verzamelen door 
middel van verschillende dataverzamelingsmogelijkheden. 
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Een interessant aspect van economische groei is dat veel ervan plaatsvindt 
door de groei van de bestaande bedrijven in een land. Dit verhoogt de interesse om 
ook de bestuurders van de bedrijven die op de Surinaamse effectenbeurs zijn 
genoteerd te bestuderen. Zij zijn verantwoordelijk voor de financiële en strategische 
beslissingen en als we willen begrijpen waarom bedrijven op een bepaalde manier 
presteren, is het van belang dat de kenmerken van hun meest invloedrijke actoren 
worden bestudeerd. Hierbij wordt in acht genomen het risicogedrag dat als 
belangrijk wordt beschouwd in de creatie van waarde voor aandeelhouders en 
toekomstige investeerders. De meeste, zo niet alle huidig onderzoek richt zich op het 
risicogedrag van bestuurders in westerse bedrijven. Wij onderzoeken het 
risicogedrag van vooraanstaande bestuurders in een opkomende economie. 
Vervolgens kijken we naar de relatie tussen het risicogedrag van deze bestuurders en 
de prestaties van de bedrijven. 
